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SEXUAL IDENTITY AS A FUNDAMENTAL
HUMAN RIGHT
Anthony R. Reeves
I. INTRODUCTION
Simply put, fundamental rights are fundamental rights.
They are not defined in terms of who is entitled to exercise
them. I
-Chief Judge Judith Kaye, Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of
Appeals (ret.)
Throughout history, people who failed to conform to societal ex-
pectations about sexual identity have been ostracized, imprisoned, and even
executed. Early in the twenty-first century, there are signs in many places
that things are improving and sexual minorities are being accorded more
rights, but they still face controversy and hostility far too often. Sexual mi-
norities encounter aggressive derision, exclusion, and legal sanctions from
those who are opposed to "alternative lifestyles." They are commonly de-
nied rights that are taken for granted by the heterosexual majority, and often
they must resort to extensive and costly legal maneuvers to accomplish
what for heterosexuals would be simple things requiring little if any legal
procedure. Some countries have decriminalized homosexual conduct and
enacted statutory and constitutional protections for sexual minorities, while
others continue to punish atypical sexual conduct with death.
Believing it is time for sexual minorities to enjoy the same rights
and protections enjoyed by other people, I ask in this article whether sexual
identity has already been established as a fundamental human right, and if
not, why? Part I discusses the problematic situation in which sexual minori-
ties find themselves today. Part II examines human rights as they relate to
sexual minorities and analyzes the existing power structure that hinders
greater progress. Part III discusses recognized rights and how they are ap-
plied vis-A-vis sexual minorities. Part IV examines the status of existing
laws throughout the world that protect or repress sexual minorities. And
Part V presents proposals for improvement of the status quo.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
On May 25, 1895, at the end of his second criminal trial, a jury
found Oscar Wilde guilty of various charges of "gross indecency" with
1 Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 382 (2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
216 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15
other males. 2 Justice Willis sentenced Wilde and his co-defendant, Alfred
Taylor to two years at hard labor:
[T]he crime of which you have been convicted is so bad
that one has to put stern restraint upon one's self to prevent
one's self from describing, in language which I would
rather not use, the sentiments which must rise to the breast
of every man of honour who has heard the details of these
two terrible trials....
It is no use for me to address you. People who can do these
things must be dead to all sense of shame, and one cannot
hope to produce any effect upon them. It is the worst case I
have ever tried.3
The most noticeable thing about Justice Willis's speech is his pal-
pable disgust. The New York Times report of the sentencing related, "[The
judge] was plainly and strongly against the prisoner."'4 It is curious that an
Old Bailey judge would have been so shocked by a non-violent crime that
he called it the worst case of his career. Particularly curious are the words,
"People who can do these things must be dead to all sense of shame, and
one cannot hope to produce any effect upon them." Clearly, to Justice Wil-
lis, homosexual acts were horrible crimes.
Justice Willis's sentiments were not new at the time, nor do they
appear outdated today. Fred Phelps, pastor of the Westboro Baptist Church
in Topeka, Kansas, has said, "Not only is homosexuality a sin, but anyone
who supports fags is just as guilty as they are. You are both worthy of
death."'5 In a debate with other Republican presidential candidates on May
3, 2007, former Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson said that employ-
2 See THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE (H. Montgomery Hyde ed., 1973). Wilde
actually endured three trials in the spring of 1895. The first trial, April 3-5, was
Wilde's prosecution of the Marquess of Queensberry for libel. The trial went quite
badly, the Marquess was acquitted, and Wilde was subsequently charged with gross
indecency. He was tried in the Central Criminal Court at the Old Bailey in London,
April 26-May 1, and the trial ended with a hung jury. Wilde's retrial, his second
criminal trial, was May 20-25. He served his two-year prison sentence and was
released from prison on May 19, 1897.
3 Id. at 339.
4 Oscar Wilde Is a Convict, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1895, available at http://query.
nytimes.com/memarchive-free/pdf?_r= 1 &res=9B05E3D7133DE433A25755C2A9
639C94649ED7CF.
5 Wired Strategies, http://www.wiredstrategies.coniphelps.html (last visited Feb.
20,2009).
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ers who disapprove of homosexuality should be able to fire gay employees. 6
In April 2003, a well-known Afrikaans gospel singer, Danie Botha, aston-
ished a South African congregation by saying that gay people will open
their eyes in hell.7 A Snickers advertisement during the 2007 Super Bowl
broadcast drew attention when it featured two men kissing. "I think we just
accidentally kissed," said one character, and the other responded, "Quick,
do something manly." Each then tore some hair from his chest. Two com-
mercials later, an advertisement for the series "Survivor" had a man saying,
"Me and Richard became friends-not in a homosexual way." He felt the
need to clarify his heterosexuality for the world. The day after the game,
sportswriter King Kaufman commented in his column, "OK, network and
advertising people, we get it. Gay is bad. Thanks for the tip." 8
In April 2008, the European Commission, under pressure from Ger-
many, abandoned plans to protect lesbians and gays against discrimination. 9
The Commission previously intended to enact a bill against all forms of
discrimination on the grounds laid out in Article 13 of the Amsterdam
Treaty.' 0 The announcement explained the change in strategy: "The com-
mission is afraid that more conservative member states will endanger the
unanimity needed by member states."'"
On December 18, 2008, sixty-six nations joined in a historic state-
ment that "international human rights protections include sexual orientation
and gender identity.' 2 This was the first such statement ever presented in
6 Queerty.com, Tommy Thompson Ain't Hiring No Gays, http://www.queerty.
comtommy-thompson-aint-hiring-no-gays-20070504/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
7 Neil Cochrane, Voicing gay experience in South Africa (2002-2005): democra-
tization, minorities and cyberspace, www.inter-disciplinary.net/ci/sexuality/s2/Neil
%20Cochrane%20paper.pdf (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). See also News24.com,
http://www.news24.com/News24/Entertainment/OffBeat/0,9294,2-1225-2107_14
43913,00.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
8 King Kaufman, Sports Daily: Colts win Super Bowl XLL Indy dominates every-
thing but the scoreboard. Plus: Big day for homophobia, Feb. 5, 2007, http://www.
salon.com/sports/col/kaufman/2007/02/05/monday/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
9 Leigh Phillips, Brussels Abandons Plans to Protect Gays and Lesbians, Apr.
22, 2008, http://euobserver.com/9/26023 (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
10 Id.
I Id.
12 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association, UN: 66
States Condemn Violations Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, http:/
/www.ilga.org/news-results.asp?LanguagelD= 1 &FileID= 121 0&FileCategory=44
&ZoneID=7 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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the General Assembly. 13 Argentina read the statement and signatories in-
cluded such diverse nations as Albania, Cuba, France, Germany, Israel, Ja-
pan, Nepal, Serbia, and Venezuela. 14 The United States did not join in the
statement."'
TERMINOLOGY
Terminology is a vexing problem when dealing with the issues dis-
cussed in this article. It is especially challenging because people who com-
prise sexual minorities do not agree about terminology, so it is possible to
offend people, sometimes so seriously that they cannot listen objectively,
simply by using the "wrong" word. Here, I will attempt to set forth briefly
the terminology that I use in the article.
At the outset, it is important to differentiate between sex and gen-
der. As I use them, the words are not synonymous. Sex refers to a person's
"biological status as male or female." 16 On the other hand, "[g]ender is a
term that is often used to refer to ways that people act, interact, or feel about
themselves, which are associated with boys/men and girls/women."1 7
Likewise, sexual orientation and gender identity are different
things. For this article, I adopt definitions of the American Psychological
Association (APA), which says, "Sexual orientation refers to an enduring
pattern of emotional, romantic, and/or sexual attractions to men, women, or
both sexes." 18 Gender identity, on the other hand, is "the psychological
sense of being male or female."' 9 This is distinct from a person's physical
sex, which is predominantly identified by genitalia. The APA defines trans-
gender as "an umbrella term used to describe people whose gender identity
(sense of themselves as male or female) or gender expression differs from
that usually associated with their birth sex." 20
Two terms I use much are sexual identity and sexual minority. Sex-
ual identity, as used here, is the composite of sexual orientation, gender
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS
ABOUT TRANSGENDER INDIVIDUALS AND GENDER IDENTITY 1 (2006), available at
http://www.apa.org/topics/transgender.html.
17 Id.
18 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, ANSWERS TO YOUR QUESTIONS FOR
A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION & HOMOSEXUALITY 1 (2008),
available at http://www.apa.org/topics/sorientation.html.
19 Id.
20 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 16, at 1.
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identity, and physical sex. For example, one may be sexually attracted to
females, identify as a male, and have female genitalia. Sexual minority is a
blanket term I use to include at least all people with non-heterosexual or
uncertain sexual attractions or practices, as well as all who have atypical or
uncertain gender identities. A very incomplete list would include homosex-
uals, bisexuals, asexuals, polysexuals, pansexuals, transsexuals, transves-
tites, drag performers, intergenders, androgynous people, bigendered
people, and gender queers.2 1
III. RIGHTS AND NORMS
The Dalai Lama, accepting the fourteenth Nobel Peace Prize in
1989, said:
Peace, in the sense of the absence of war, is of little value
to someone who is dying of hunger or cold. It will not re-
move the pain of torture inflicted on a prisoner of con-
science. It does not comfort those who have lost their loved
ones in floods caused by senseless deforestation in a neigh-
boring country. Peace can only last where human rights are
respected, where the people are fed, and where individuals
and nations are free.22
The Dalai Lama's words help put the concept of rights into perspective.
Rights are often interdependent and make sense only within the context of
other rights. To elaborate on the Dalai Lama's example, the freedom to live
openly as a transsexual or homosexual is of little comfort to a person who is
starving to death. And a person who is adequately fed and enjoys freedom
and liberty still cannot be fulfilled without the liberty to live as herself, and
to experience and celebrate the full spectrum of human existence within an
intimate relationship that can fulfill her fundamental emotional and sexual
needs.
Millions of people in the world cannot have such a fulfilling exis-
tence-those who constitute sexual minorities and cannot or will not live as
themselves. It is impossible to know how many people are in this predica-
ment because so many nations are in denial or refuse to cooperate, and so
many people find life safer if they live "in the closet. ' '23 This is tragic, for
21 See generally Id. and AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, supra note 18,
at 1.
22 The 14th Dalai Lama, Nobel Lecture, (Dec. 11, 1989), available at http://nobel
prize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/19891lama-lecture.html.
23 "Living in the closet" could be inferred from a well known example occurred
on September 24, 2007, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told an
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no one should be forced to make the kinds of choices millions of people
have to make-choices such as denying one's sexuality or losing one's life,
which is precisely the choice facing homosexuals in Muslim nations like
Iran that punish homosexual activity with death. 24 No one should have to
choose whether to have satisfying intimate relationships although it means
being unemployed and homeless versus living without genuine intimacy but
having a job and a home, which is precisely the choice potentially facing
many people in places that do not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
identity. People throughout the world have to choose every day between
being honest about who they are on the one hand, and having loving fami-
lies or practicing the religion of their choice on the other. They face this
awful choice because they do not, or cannot, conform to the heterosexual
norm.
HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are "[t]he freedoms, immunities, and benefits that,
according to modem values (esp[ecially] at an international level), all
human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right in the society in
which they live. '25 A fundamental right is "[a] right derived from natural or
fundamental law. '26 Fundamental human rights exist as part of the natural
order; particular rights are recognized when circumstances allow them to be
perceived. In practice, people pursue claims that are sometimes elevated to
their legitimate place as rights.
Human rights began to be recognized in the international forum in
the years following World War II. That era saw marked changes in the
international legal system: the war crimes trials (e.g., Tokyo Trial,
1946-48; Nuremberg Trial, 1945-46), the adoption of the United Nations
Charter (1945), and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948). One of the most revolutionary aspects of the end of the war
was that the victor nations "applied international law doctrines and concepts
audience at Columbia University, "In Iran we don't have homosexuals like in your
country." See 'We don't have any gays in Iran,' Iranian president tells Ivy League
audience, THE DAILY MAIL, Sept. 25, 2007, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/
articles/news/worldnews.htnl?inarticleid=483746&in-page_id=1811 (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2009).
24 A recent article in THE TIMES (London) reports that more than 4,000 gay men
and lesbians have been executed in Iran since 1979. See Richard Ford & Rajeev
Syal, Gay Iranian Wins Asylum Reprieve, THE TIMES (London), Mar. 14, 2008, at
15, available at LexisNexis.
25 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 758 (8th ed. 2004).
26 Id. at 697.
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to impose criminal punishment on individuals for their [wartime] commis-
sion of ... crimes under international law .... *27
This extraordinary result was made possible by the international
adoption of agreements that converted moral imperatives to international
law. The documents that reflect these agreements are often called the Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights (IBHR),28 comprising portions of the United
Nations Charter, along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR),29 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),30 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cul-
tural Rights (ISESCR). 3' This group of documents established the basic set
of human rights norms. Today, the United Nations Human Rights Treaty
System has grown to include seven major treaties that have further ex-
panded these norms.32 In mid-2007, "three-quarters or more of United Na-
tions member states [had] ratified [at least] five" of the treaties, 3 3 reflecting
27 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 115 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip
Alston eds., 2d ed. 2008).
28 See Fact Sheet No.2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human Rights, available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm.
29 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec. 1948), U.N.G.A. Res. 217
A (III) (1948), available at http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html [hereinafter
UDHR].
30 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm [hereinaf-
ter ICCPR].
31 See International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3,
1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/htmlmenu3/b/acescr.
htm [hereinafter ICESCR].
32 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/treaty/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2009). In addition to the ICCPR and ICESCR, the seven include the
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Con-
vention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the Convention on the Rghts of the Child, and the International Con-
vention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families.
33 Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, 12 ANN. SURV.
INr'L & COMp. L. 219, 226 (2006). See also International Convention of the Pro-
tection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families New York, 18
December 1990, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/13.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 9, 2009); Human Rights Bodies, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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the widespread international acceptance of the conventions and, hence, of
their promulgated norms. Rights recognized in the IBHR and other United
Nations treaties have been important in developing human rights law in
areas including, among others, equal treatment, freedom from slavery and
servitude, freedom from torture, and the right to own property.
Human rights are also recognized through their entrenchment as
customary, binding international law by opinio juris.34 Ideas and aspirations
that begin as nonbinding law can evolve into a rule nations obey because
they feel obligated to do so under international law, and when this happens,
the ideas have generally become binding law.35 Only a nation that persist-
ently objects to the rights in question can shield itself from being subject to
any customary law that develops. 36 But this can be difficult for a nation to
do if the ideal is widespread and the nation does not want the international
community to perceived it as unreasonable or obstructionist. Eric Engle has
argued that "[t]he idea of human rights is ... so attractive[ ] that it is liter-
ally impossible for all but the most tyrannical of states to deny their exis-
tence and retain credibility as legitimate expressions of popular will." 37
It is undeniable that decriminalizing homosexual conduct and guar-
anteeing equal rights has spread through much of the Western world, partic-
ularly Europe, over the last thirty years. It is possible that some nations
have gone along although neither their people nor their leadership have an
enlightened view of sexual minorities, 38 but the laws have nonetheless been
changed, and societal expectations will develop accordingly. In fact, I be-
lieve that no genuine change of attitudes about such a controversial matter
is possible unless governments take the initiative to express clear expecta-
31 Opinio juris sive necessitatis: "The principle that for conduct or a practice to
become a rule of customary international law, it must be shown that nations believe
that international law (rather than moral obligation) mandates the conduct or prac-
tice." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1125 (8th ed. 2004).
35 See generally Jo Lynn Slama, Opinio Juris In Customary International Law, 15
OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 610 (1990).
36 Id.
37 Engle, supra note 33, at 230. See also Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony and
International Law Speaking Law to Power: Popular Sovereignty, Human Rights,
and the New International Order, 1 Cm. J. INT'L L. 12 (2000).
38 For example, complying with the membership requirements of the European
Union, which include "stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of
law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities." See European
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement-process/accession-
process/criteria/indexen.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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tions and ideals by changing laws. In the case of sexual minorities, the
reason is heteronormativity.
HETERONORMATIVITY
With all the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the move for
expanded rights for sexual minorities, many people are surprised to learn
that sexual minorities have existed throughout recorded history on every
continent, a fact documented by artifacts and writing from earlier eras.3 9
Given this longstanding history, the fact that no better accommodation has
been found by now demonstrates the depth and strength of the feelings the
subject evokes. Whether opponents of rights for sexual minorities invoke
morality, tradition, or some other argument, the logic at bottom is often, "It
just isn't natural." To better understand why, one must understand
heteronormativity.
Human beings like what we know. We like routine, long for secur-
ity, and want to know who we are and how we fit into the world around us.
We like to be with others who are like us. This intrinsic need for the famil-
iar, together with the corresponding fear of what is different or unknown,
has led to heteronormativity, or normative heterosexuality. Heteronormativ-
ity may be defined as "[tihose punitive rules (social, familial, and legal) that
force us to conform to hegemonic, heterosexual standards for identity.
40
Put another way, it is: "Those prescribed guides for conduct or action, en-
forced by punishment, that force us to be similar or identical to the social,
cultural, ideological, and economic standards prescribed by sexual desire
toward the opposite sex, for our generic character that constitutes the objec-
tive reality of what we are."'4 1
"Heteronormativity stems from the essentialist belief that there are
only two sexes-male and female, and that a certain set of behaviours and
expectations follow from one's sex."'42 Sociologist Erin Davis notes that this
"dominant gender paradigm constructs two genders as naturally rooted in
39 See generally R. C. Kirkpatrick, The Evolution of Human Homosexual Behav-
ior, CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY, Vol. 41 No. 3, 385 (June 2000). See also Timothy
Taylor, Uncovering the Prehistory of Sex, BRITISH ARCHAEOLOGY, No. 15 (June
1996), available at http://www.britarch.ac.uk/ba/bal5/bal5feat.html#taylor.
40 Terms Used by Theorists of Gender & Sex, http://www.cla.purdue.edu/
academic/engl/theory/genderandsex/terms/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
41 Using definitions from MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 577,
584, 616, 1009, 1089, and 1216 (1lth ed. 2003).
42 Derek Leschasin, Heteronormativity, http://io.uwinnipeg.ca/-taylor/Heteronor
mativity.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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two biologically based sexes."'43 This compelling gender binary enslaves
society, because it forces the division of all people (and many things and
animals) into male and female gender roles, gender identities, and personal
attributes.
The theory of normative heterosexuality proposes that we have
learned to associate particular gender roles with a particular sex-for exam-
ple, being a housekeeper with female. We have learned these associations
so well that we project them onto every human being, and if a person's
preferred roles fail to agree with his sex as our learned perception dictates
they should, trouble often follows. This kind of thinking is, of course, quite
limiting. For example, in most of the world housekeeping is typically per-
ceived as a female job, not a male one. According to this perception, males
should neither do the work nor want to, but females should do it and want
to. Many parts of life that touch even tangentially upon housekeeping are
specifically defined and limited in terms of female and male; for instance, a
large amount of the advertising for dishwashing products targets female
consumers.
Heteronormativity and the gender binary exist everywhere, al-
though "[a] small number of nonwestern societies accommodate alternative
genders."44 Even residents of "gay ghettos," where gender roles are often
blurred, are never far from the "real" world, and the very fact that their
neighborhood is marginalized into a "ghetto" is evidence of the hetero-
normative society surrounding it and enforcing the marginalization.
In much of the world, heteronormativity is combined with patri-
archy, the assignment of authority to the male sex, yielding perhaps the
most formidable and exclusive of societal structures, the heteronormative
patriarchy. Ugandan law professor Sylvia Tamale has explained:
The assumptions that underlie gender relations in patriar-
chal societies foreground heteronormativity, that is, hetero-
sexuality, as the norm .... [Heteronormativity] means that
human sexual relations are "normatively" expected to take
place between members of the opposite sex. Precisely, it
assumes a "natural" hierarchy in sexual relations between a
dominant male partner and a subordinate female mate.
These assumptions are communicated through various
43 Erin Calhoun Davis, Situating "Fluidity": (Trans) Gender Identification and
the Regulation of Gender Diversity, GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN & GAY STUD-
IES, Vol. 15No. 1, 97, 97 (2009)(emphasis omitted).
44 Gender, Alternatives to Binary, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 271 (William, A. Darity, Jr. ed., 2d ed., 2008).
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means including religion, culture, education, the law, and
the media. Women (and men) who resist heterosexuality
and subvert dominant culture are subjected to strict punitive
laws and discriminatory social discourses. 45
Heteronormative patriarchy, like heteronormativity, exists everywhere, al-
though in some parts of the Western world it has grown less predominant as
women have acquired more rights and expanded their gender roles. Africa,
Asia, and parts of Latin America are arguably today's strongholds of heter-
onormative patriarchy.
SEXUAL MINORITIES IN A HETERONORMATIVE WORLD
The expectations held by sexual minorities emerge-to the
extent that they emerge at all-in a legal and social world
long built on their subordination and (failed) erasure. These
expectations take shape in a context of insults produced by
an unrelenting matrix of heterosexual coercion, where the
rule for intimate object-choice between persons is cross-sex
only. For these minorities, a wide gap exists between their
private expectations and public realities, no less crushing
and unavoidable for having been socially constructed.
Scholarship and criticism can pave the way for a future le-
gal reform to narrow this expectations gap. 46
The increasing tolerance of sexual minorities has caused a harmful
backlash of fear. Not everyone is in favor of the liberalization of attitudes
that has emerged in the last twenty-five years. Heteronormativity gives
enormous power to heterosexual people. Many of these heterosexuals have
been frightened by the recent societal changes and feel helpless to respond.
Their fear and helplessness have found outlets in rage, violence, and
politicizing against sexual minorities. Professor Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller
has observed, "By calling into question the spatial locations of civilization
... [the] jurisprudence of sexual liberty also upsets common assumptions
45 Sylvia Tamale, Law, Sexuality, and Politics in Uganda: Challenges for Wo-
men's Human Rights NGOs 89 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Buffalo Human Rights Law Review).
46 Jose Gabilondo, Asking the Straight Question: How to Come to Speech in Spite
of Conceptual Liquidation as a Homosexual, 21 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (2006).
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about the homogeneity of culture. '47 1 do not mean to suggest that this fear-
rage response is in any way a conscious reaction, but anger is a universal
human response commonly resulting from fear; hostility and aggression are
related emotions that can grow from anger.48
Men and women who feel powerful in heteronormative society are
secure because they knew how they fit into the world and how their power
compares to that of other people. Getting married (to one of the opposite
sex), making a home, and rearing a family are all things they perceive as
means to the end of happiness, or at least relevance. Achieving these things
leads to security. In reality, of course, those things constitute an entrance
into the powerful heteronormative world, and when the security of that
world is threatened by the idea of admitting as equals people who have not
done the correct (i.e., heteronormative) things to earn the privileged status,
the "traditional" members scramble to retain the status quo. Michel Fou-
cault wrote, "[I]f repression has indeed been the fundamental link between
power, knowledge, and sexuality since the classical age, it stands to reason
that we will not be able to free ourselves from it except at a considerable
cost . . . . "49 The cost of freeing ourselves from the heteronormative beast
has yet to be determined.
In today's world, although exceptions to the gender binary are be-
coming more common, they often encounter hostility. A ready example ex-
ists in American schools. "A recent study of California students found that
53% of students said their schools were not safe for guys who aren't as
masculine as other guys, and 34% of students said their schools were not
safe for girls who aren't as feminine as other girls." 50 The hostility toward
those who are different is not a simple phenomenon, and is complicated by
the fact that sexual orientation means different things to different people
and different cultures. Eric Heinze, professor of law at Queen Mary, Uni-
versity of London, notes that "Indian hijras, Makassar kawe kawe, Native
47 Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, Canada Is a Blue State: Global Jurisprudence and
Domestic Consciousness in American Gay Rights Discourse, 1 J. INT'L L. & INrT'L
REL. 261, 265 (2005).
48 See generally William E. Breen, Anger Experience and Expression in Socially
Anxious Individuals After Imagined Social Rejection: Testing the Moderating Role
of Experiential Avoidance (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Mason
University) (on file with the Buffalo Human Rights Law Review), available at
ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, Vol. 0622No. 0883.
49 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. 1: AN INTRODUCTION 5
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978).
50 STEPHANIE CHO, ET AL., GAY-STRAIGHT ALLIANCE NETWORK, BEYOND THE BI-
NARY: A TOOL KIT FOR GENDER IDENTITY Ac'ivIsM IN SCHOOLS 1 (2004).
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American berdaches, homosexual South African mine workers, and Euro-
American gays have lived and understood themselves differently." 51 All
sexual minorities understand themselves differently, as groups and as indi-
viduals. The perpetual problem is, however these people might understand
themselves, most of the heteronormative society around them perceives
them differently. For example, a Western gay man may want only to find
someone with whom to share love and life, but much of society sees or
perceives him as an undesirable aberration or even as a threat to its way of
life. What seems natural and perhaps unremarkable to the person who is
"different" simultaneously can seem deviant, and maybe outrageous, to
others.
Given this perspective, it becomes clearer that the only way to
achieve eventual general acceptance of those who live outside the gender
binary, who defy heteronormative patriarchy, is for governments to be
proactive and enact laws that guarantee the freedom to live openly whatever
one's sexual identity may be, and that guarantee equality of opportunity and
rights for sexual minorities.
HETERONORMATIVE POWER IN THE WESTERN WORLD
United States
The American heteronormative power structure has a mighty arse-
nal to defend its position. For example, nongovernmental penalties for fail-
ing to conform to the norm can be massive. The threat of massive socio-
economic loss faces those who fail to conform to the heterosexual power
model. For example, nonconformists may lose the love and companionship
of family and friends. They may lose gifts and inheritances, and-in many
places-jobs and homes. Numerous penalties are associated with religion.
Nonconformist people may be excluded or formally expelled from their
churches, faith communities, and places of worship. Worse, they may be
coerced back into the closet in the ostensible hope of "being saved from
eternal condemnation." Under threat of ostracism or worse, nonconformists
may face intense pressure to enter purported treatment programs designed
to help people repress or disguise sexuality or gender identity and assume a
socially acceptable, heteronormative identity.
Governmental strictures and penalties can be devastating. In some
places, homosexual parents can lose custodial rights to their children. Cer-
tain property rights may be forfeited, social security and retirement benefits
51 ERic HEINZE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A HUMAN RIGHT 77 (1995).
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may be severely impacted, and people who want to serve in the military are
not allowed to do so. 52
Marriage, of course, is almost never possible. In the United States,
it has been estimated that marriage confers approximately 1,400 benefits on
the marital partners. 53 These benefits are denied to everyone who does not
fit the normative heterosexual paradigm that is a prerequisite to marriage in
almost every state. 54 Even in the few states that accommodate same-sex
couples, approximately 1,000 of the 1,400 marital benefits remain unavaila-
ble because the Federal government, which does not recognize same-sex
marriage under any circumstances, administers those 1,000 benefits. 55
-In Lawrence v. Texas, 56 the United States Supreme Court decided
that states could not maintain statutes that criminalized homosexual conduct
between consenting adults. Justice Anthony Kennedy acknowledged some
of these problems, and observed that they are largely the result of powerful
voices "that for centuries ... [have] condemn[ed] homosexual conduct as
immoral." 57 Justice Kennedy stated that "[t]he condemnation has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior,
and respect for the traditional family. ' 58 Justice Kennedy astutely observed,
"These considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The
issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce
these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law. ' 59
While the Court held in Lawrence that such state power had limits, it has
nonetheless left most such power undisturbed.
It would be a serious error to assume that the defenders of hetero-
normativity in America are all "old White people." Immigrants and their
progeny who are from areas of the world where heteropatriarchal lifestyles
still dominate tend to be quite reluctant to abandon what they perceive as
their cultural and moral standards. Religion is often a factor: "Each ethnic
group has its own expression of religion that is unique to that particular
52 See generally Emily Brandon, Marriage and Social Security Benefits, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 9, 2008, available at http://www.usnews.com/
articles/business/retirement/2008/0 1/09/marriage-and-social-security-benefits.html.
51 ReligiousTolerance.org, Legal and economic benefits of marriage, http://www.
religioustolerance.org/marbene.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
54 A few states offer civil unions with comparable legal status to marriage, and
Massachusetts allows same-sex couples to be married. See infra p. 53 and note 253.
55 Id.
56 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
57 Id. at 571.
58 Id.
59 Id. (emphasis added).
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population, and many of these expressions are harshly critical of LGBTs
.... ,,60 The circumstances in which immigrant families enter and live in
this country are also a factor. Eithne Luibhrid, a leading scholar in wo-
men's studies, has noted, "Heteronormative policies and practices-which
subordinate immigrants not just on grounds of sexual orientation but also on
grounds of gender, racial, class, and cultural identities that may result in
'undesirable' sexual acts or outcomes (such as 'too many' poor children)-
are deployed by the state to select who may legally enter the United States
and to incorporate immigrants into hegemonic nationalist identities and
projects."6 ' Asian-American historian Judy Tzu-Chun Wu states, "In Asian
American history, the tendency to accept heterosexuality unquestioningly as
the norm is linked to the field's critique of racially motivated intrusions on
the construction of family .... [It] is premised upon unexamined assump-
tions of certain forms of family and hence sexual behavior as being natu-
rally desirable. '62
Many scholars believe that African American communities hold
particularly fast to their heteronormative heritage. "[F]ears of the conse-
quences of straying from normative models have only been magnified by
the prominent role of the black church in African American communi-
ties .... [T]he situation for LGBT members of African American families is
uniquely affected by the role of the black church in promoting an uncom-
monly virulent strain of homophobia. ' ' 63 This alleged characteristic of the
African-American community resulted in considerable blaming of African
Americans for the passage of California's Proposition 8 in 2008, an asser-
tion that others have vigorously challenged.64
60 Michael Bennett and Juan Battle, "We Can See Them, But We Can't Hear
Them." LGBT Members of African American Families, in QUEER FAMILIES QUEER
POLITICS: CHALLENGING CULTURE IN THE STATE 53, 58 (Mary Bernstein and
Renate Reimann eds., 2001).
61 Eithne Luibh6id, Heteronormativity and Immigration Scholarship: A Call for
Change, GLQ: A JOURNAL OF LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES VO1. 10 No. 2, 227, 227
(2004).
62 Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, Asian American History and Racialized Compulsory Devi-
ance, J. WOMEN'S HIST. Vol. 15 No. 3, 58-62 (2003).
63 Bennett & Battle, supra note 60, at 58.
64 See Byron York, Black Voters Save Proposition 8, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE,
Nov. 5, 2008, available at http://comer.nationalreview.com/post/?q=YWEyMDc
2YmNiMTJkOTIOYjdjNjAwYmE4YzUzZGU3NTU=. See also Southern Califor-
nia Public Radio, African-Americans Largely Supported Propositions, http://www.
scpr.org/news/stories/2008/l 1/07/08_minorities-eight_110.html (last visited Feb.
20, 2009) ("A CNN exit poll shows that the amendment to ban same-sex marriage
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The influence of our heteronormative orientation is clearly visible
in court decisions of the last three decades. For example, in Hernandez v.
Robles,65 the New York Court of Appeals used a "welfare of the children"
argument to hold that "the New York Constitution does not compel recogni-
tion of marriages between members of the same sex. Whether such mar-
riages should be recognized is a question to be addressed by the
Legislature. 66
The petitioners argued that New York statutes, which allow only
opposite-sex marriages, violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the New York Constitution. 67 The Court applied a rational basis
test and determined that "at least two grounds" rationally supported the
state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, "both of which are
derived from the undisputed assumption that marriage is important to the
welfare of children." 68 The grounds that were cited were classic hetero-
normative reasons: (1) "for the welfare of children, it is more important to
promote stability, and to avoid instability, in opposite-sex than in same-sex
relationships; '69 and (2) "it is better, other things being equal, for children
to grow up with both a mother and a father. '70 The Court was operating
under the unverified assumption that heterosexuals make better parents than
non-heterosexuals.
New York Chief Judge Judith Kaye dissented from the Court's
opinion in Hernandez. First, she disagreed with the rational basis standard
the Court's majority used in upholding the statute:
[T]he right to due process of law protects certain .funda-
mental liberty interests, including the right to marry. Cen-
tral to the right to marry is the right to marry the person of
split white, Latino, and Asian-American voters roughly 50/50. But 70 percent of
African American voters favored Prop 8."). Many people, however, have chal-
lenged such allegations. See, e.g., John Wildermuth, Black Support for Prop. 8
Called Exaggeration, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 7, 2009, available at http://
www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/01/06/BANB 154oS 1 .DTL. Pro-
position 8 was a voter initiative to amend the California Constitution to "eliminate[
the] right of same-sex couples to marry." Official Voter Information Guide, http://
www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/title-sum/prop8-title-sum.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2009). Proposition 8 passed with approximately 52% of the vote.
65 Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338 (N.Y. 2006).
66 Id. at 356.
67 Id. at 358.
68 Id. at 359.
69 Id.
70 Id.
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one's choice. The deprivation of a fundamental right is sub-
ject to strict scrutiny and requires that the infringement be
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 7'
In this brief passage, Chief Judge Kaye also managed to frame the right to
marry the person of one's choice as a fundamental right, and took the Court
to task: "The Court concludes, however, that same-sex marriage is not
deeply rooted in tradition, and thus cannot implicate any fundamental lib-
erty. But fundamental rights, once recognized, cannot be denied to particu-
lar groups on the ground that these groups have historically been denied
those rights. '72 She further argued, "It is no answer that same-sex couples
can be excluded from marriage because 'marriage,' by definition, does not
include them. In the end, 'an argument that marriage is heterosexual be-
cause it 'just is' amounts to circular reasoning.' 7
Judge Kaye also discussed the importance of the benefits denied
same-sex people by denying their right to marry:
Unlike married spouses, same-sex partners may be denied
hospital visitation of their critically ill life partners. They
must spend more of their joint income to obtain equivalent
levels of health care coverage. They may, upon the death of
their partners, find themselves at risk of losing the family
home.... Same-sex families are, among other things, de-
nied equal treatment with respect to intestacy, inheritance,
tenancy by the entirety, taxes, insurance, health benefits,
medical decisionmaking, workers' compensation, the right
to sue for wrongful death and spousal privilege. Each of
these statutory inequities .. .violates [same-sex couples']
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.74
She also framed the central issue differently than the majority opinion did:
"[T]he question before [the Court] is not whether the marriage statutes
properly benefit those they are intended to benefit-any discriminatory
classification does that-but whether there exists any legitimate basis for
excluding those who are not covered by the law."' 75 Judge Kay then noted
that the disputed statutes, which effectively prohibit same-sex marriage, dis-
7' Id. at 380 (citations omitted).
72 Id. at 381.
73 Id. at 385, quoting Halpern v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 65 O.R.3d 161, 172
O.A.C. 276, 91 71 (2003).
74 Id. at 386.
75 Id. (emphasis added; emphasis removed from "excluding").
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criminate "[o]n three independent grounds": 76 sexual orientation discrimina-
tion,77 sex discrimination,'7 and fundamental right.79 Judge Kaye argued
that "th[ese] discriminatory classification[s] [are] subject to heightened
scrutiny, a test that defendants concede it cannot pass."80
The argument that children do better with parents of opposite sexes
is an old one, but one that simply is not supported by objective, reliable
evidence. Neither same-sex marriage nor gay adoption have been legal any-
where long enough for broad information and data to be gathered and ana-
lyzed by objective parties.8' Hawai'i Circuit Judge Gary Chang responded
to the same argument in 1996 with the observation, "[T]here is diversity in
the structure and configuration of families . . . [but] [t]he evidence
presented ... establishes that the single most important factor in the devel-
opment of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted child is the nurturing relation-
ship between parent and child." 82 A significant amount of the data that is
beginning to accumulate suggests that Judge Chang was correct. Some stud-
ies, for example, have shown that the children of single heterosexual par-
ents "have more difficulties than children who have parents of the same
sex." '83 The American Psychological Association, in an official policy state-
ment, has declared: "[R]esearch has shown that the adjustment, develop-
ment, and psychological well-being of children is unrelated to parental
sexual orientation and that the children of lesbian and gay parents are as
likely as those of heterosexual parents to flourish. 84
76 Id.
77 Id. at 387.
78 Id. at 389.
79 Id. at 390.
80 Id. at 386.
81 See B.A. Robinson, Same-sex marriage (SSM): How do children fare in fami-
lies led by same-sex parents?, ONTARIO CONSULTATNTS ON RELIGIOUS TOLER-
ANCE, Oct. 26, 2004, http://www.religioustolerance.org/hommarl3.htm.
82 Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at 17 (Hawai'i Cir. Ct. 1996).
83 . Study: Same-Sex Parents Raise Well-Adjusted Kids, WEBMD HEALTH NEWS,
Oct.12, 2005, http://www.webmd.com/mental-health/news/20051012/study-same-
sex-parents-raise-well-adjusted-kids (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
84 Ruth U. Paige, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association for the
Legislative Year 2004: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of Represent-
atives, February 20-22, 2004, Washington, DC, and July 28 and 30, 2004, Hono-
lulu, Hawaii, and Minutes of the February, April, June, August, October, and
December 2004 Meetings of the Board of Directors., AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST,
Vol. 60 No. 5, 436, PINCITE (2005), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/
policy/parents.html.
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Outside the United States
Heteronormativity is also powerful in the Western world outside
the United States. For example, in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal,
8 5
it is easy to see the influence of heteronormative thinking on the Portuguese
Court of Appeal. Applicant Salgueiro da Silva Mouta married a woman in
1983, and they had a daughter in 1987. The couple separated in 1990 and
divorced 1993. The husband, who was gay, moved in with another man. In
1991, after the separation, they signed an agreement awarding parental re-
sponsibility to the mother with the father retaining contact (visitation)
rights. But the mother subsequently would not allow the father to visit his
daughter.86
In 1992, the father sued for parental responsibility for the child,
arguing that the mother failed to comply with the custody agreement and
that he was in a better position to look after their child. In her reply, the
mother accused the applicant's live-in boyfriend of having sexually abused
the child.87 After an investigation, the Lisbon Family Affairs Court in 1994
awarded parental responsibility to the father and dismissed the mother's
allegations of sexual abuse as unfounded.88
A year later, the mother abducted the child.89 The father reported
the abduction and instituted criminal proceedings, 90 but the Lisbon Court of
Appeal reversed the lower court and awarded parental responsibility to the
mother.91 The Court of Appeal stated that mothers should have custody of
young children unless there were overriding reasons to the contrary, and
that custody should definitely be with the mother in this case because the
child should live in a traditional Portuguese family. 92 Homosexuality, the
Court found, was an abnormality, and children should not grow up in ab-
normal situations. 93
The father appealed to the European Commission on Human Rights
(which has been replaced by the European Court of Human Rights, in-
85 Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal, App. No. 33290/96 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
(1999), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/ (follow "{Case-law" hyperlink;
then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink).
86 Id. at 10.
87 Id. at 11.
88 Id. at 12.
89 Id. at 13.
90 Id.
91 Id. at[ 14.
92 Id.
93 Id.
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terchambeably, the "ECHR"), which found that "the Court of Appeal made
a distinction based on considerations regarding the applicant's sexual orien-
tation, a distinction which is not acceptable under the Convention [for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms] . '94 The ECHR
stated that it could find no "reasonable relationship of proportionality...
between the means employed and the aim pursued," so there was a violation
of the father's right to respect for privacy and family life. 95
HETERONORMATIVE POWER OUTSIDE THE WESTERN WORLD
The non-Western world remains largely under the control of patri-
archal heteronormativity. Several important factors make Asia and Africa
especially prone to retaining this oppressive regime, including the tradi-
tional way of life, the slow progress of women's rights, and the stubborn,
lingering influence of European colonialization. "Precolonial societies in
Africa were not immune to manipulating culture to oppress women," writes
Sylvia Tamale.96 "Likewise, the Judeo-Christian and Arabic-Islamic cul-
tures imposed a particular sexuality on African women as 'hyperdeveloped'
and in need of control. This cultural construction facilitated the consolida-
tion of the patriarchal colonial state. In a postcolonial context, the legacies
of these two sociopolitical formations impose a variety of gendered con-
structs on the African woman. '97
It may be impossible for many Americans to achieve a real under-
standing of the complexities of these cultures. For example, while state-
sponsored violence toward sexual minorities is rare in the West, this is not
so elsewhere in the world. "In some countries, state violence flows from
laws that continue to criminalize homosexuality, particularly in postcolonial
governments of South Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean-many still preserv-
ing British laws now abandoned by the United Kingdom itself-and Islamic
governments of the Arab world, Southwest Asia, and Malaysia."98 In addi-
tion, in many non-western societies, same-sex physical relationships are
considered quite distinct from romantic liaisons. "Casual contacts between
non-homosexual identified males that remain common in those cultures
94 Id. at 36.
95 Id. at 22.
96 Tamale, supra note 45, at 82-83.
97 Id. at 83.
98 Barry D. Adam, Homophobia and Heterosexism, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF SOCIOLOGY (George Ritzer ed. 2007), available at http://www.blackwell
reference.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=G9781405124331_chunk-g97814051243311
4_ssl-43.
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[most of Latin America, Africa, and the Arab world] will often express a
power difference, or be accompanied by a financial transaction." 99
Islam has held very tightly to its heteronormative roots. The reason
may have to do with the fact that the Qur'an arguably decries homosexual-
ity even more unequivocally than the Hebrew and Christian scriptures do.
As Nicole Kligerman explains, "The Qur'an is very explicit in its condem-
nation of homosexuality, with very few loopholes with which to theologi-
cally condone gays in Islam."100 Anthropologist Tom Boellstorff has
observed, "In contemporary Islamic law, as in contemporary Western law,
'husband and wife [are] established as the core intimate relationship around
which law, politics, and policy revolve.' "101 The predominant belief in Is-
lam, similar to much of evangelical Christianity, seems to be that atypical
sexual or gender identities are strongly influenced by environment. 10 2 One
popular website, Investigating Islam, claims:
Humans are not homosexuals by nature. People become
homosexuals because of their environments. Particularly
critical is the environment during puberty. Suggestions,
ideas [and] strange dreams are symptoms of confused at-
tempts to understand new and blunt sexual desires and are
rashly interpreted as defining someone as being one sexual-
ity or another....
Sexuality is a choice of identity which follows choices of
action which follow from choices "of what to have sexual
fantasies about....
The truth is-you are what you choose to be; you do what
you choose to do; you think what you choose to think....
[A]nyone can change themselves. There are reformed ex-
drug addicts, reformed ex-compulsive gamblers and ex-
99 Gert Hekma, Homosexuality, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY
(George Ritzer, ed. 2007), available at http://www.blackwellreference.com/
subscriber/tocnode?id=G9781405124331 chunk-g978140512433114_ssl-44.
100 Nicole Kligerman, Homosexuality in Islam: A Difficult Paradox, MACALESTER
ISLAM J., Vol. 2 No. 3, 52, 53 (2007) (developing thesis that while the Qur'an
explicitly condemns homosexuality, in traditional Islamic societies, the acts them-
selves were not condemned as long as they were behind closed doors).
101 Tom Boellstorff, Domesticating Islam: Sexuality, Gender, and the Limits of
Pluralism, LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY, Vol. 31 No. 4, 1035, 1045 (2006), quoting
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 1 (1995).
102 See, e.g., What is Islam's view of homosexuality?, http://www.islamic.org.uk/
homosex.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2009).
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homosexuals. In all these sins prevention is 1000 times bet-
ter than cure and much easier. 10 3
But exceptions to these extreme ideas exist in Islamic thought. Another
website reports, "Some self-described liberal Muslims accept and consider
homosexuality as natural .... However, this position remains highly contro-
versial even amongst liberal movements within Islam, and is considered
completely beyond the pale by mainstream Islam." 104
In most Islamic nations, homosexual conduct is still a crime. 105
Penalties range from a fine and/or flogging to death. 106 No predominantly
Islamic nations joined a December 2008 historic statement in the United
Nations General Assembly that condemned human rights abuses against
sexual minorities. 0 7 In fact, immediately after that statement, the Syrian
delegation presented an opposing statement on behalf of fifty-seven nations,
most of which had a significant Muslim population. 0 8 Although the state-
ment condemned "all forms of stereotyping, exclusion, stigmatization,
prejudice, intolerance and discrimination and violence directed against peo-
ples, communities and individuals on any ground whatsoever, wherever
they occur," it specifically excluded "the so-called notions of sexual orien-
tation and gender identity."'10 9
IV. EXISTING RIGHTS AND SEXUAL MINORITIES
Essential documents, sich as those in the International Bill of
Human Rights, recognize fundamental rights like equality, privacy, and lib-
erty. Many national constitutions and statutes recognize these rights and
others like them, such as the right to be free from sex discrimination. So a
legitimate question is whether sexual minorities' rights have already been
recognized, since sexual minorities are already protected by the same laws
103 Id.
1 Homosexuality and Islam, available at http://www.religionfacts.com/homosex
uality/islam.htm#5.
105 See generally DANIEL OTrOSSON, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD
SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME SEX ACTIVITY BETWEEN CONSENTING
ADULTS (2008).
106 See generally id.
107 International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans & Intersex Association, supra note
12.
108 Michael Nugent, UN Split on Protecting Gay Rights, HAPPINESS, http:Ilwww.
michaelnugent.com/2008/12/21/un-split-on-protecting-gay-rights/ (last visited Mar.
1, 2008).
109 Id.
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that protect everyone else. Professor Debra DeLaet, who teaches human
rights and international law, has observed, "A variety of provisions in these
core documents could provide protection ... if international human rights
law were expanded to preclude discrimination on the grounds of sexual
orientation."' 1 0 I will argue, however, that even if human rights law were so
expanded, laws explicitly protecting sexual minorities would still be re-
quired to achieve the necessary ultimate change in attitudes.
EXISTING LAWS THAT SOMETIMES PROTECT SEXUAL MINORITIES
The existing laws used to protect sexual minorities are generally
constitutional provisions, antidiscrimination statutes, and asylum laws.
The last thirty-seven years have unquestionably brought impressive
progress in recognition of the rights of sexual minorities, largely accom-
plished under laws that apply to everyone. Numerous writers have argued
that discrimination because of sexual identity is already prohibited, since
the IBHR documents and numerous national statutes and constitutions con-
tain protections against sex discrimination. For example, Maria Pronk has
observed:
Discrimination on the grounds of 'sex' is often the conse-
quence of a sort of behavior which is not in conformity
with what is regarded as the normal gender roles. If the
prohibition of discrimination implies that discrimination on
the grounds of sex is forbidden, then it follows that there
can be no such thing as a standard behavioural pattern be-
ing attached to gender. Discrimination on the grounds of
homosexuality ...could fall under discrimination on the
grounds of sex, and could therefore be forbidden."'
And Eric Heinze has stated, "'Sex' need not simply be reduced to 'gender'
... [or] to differences between men and women, or.. . to discrimination by
men against women. Rather, it could include any kind of discrimination
arising from sexuality, sexual behavior, or sexual norms.""l 2 This argument
is strong, and finds further support in many dictionary definitions of "sex."
For instance, one dictionary says sex is "the sum of the structural, func-
tional, and behavioral characteristics of organisms that are involved in re-
110 Debra L. DeLaet, Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Where Is the Protection Against Sex-
ual Orientation Discrimination in International Human Rights Law?, 7 LAW &
SEXUALITY 31, 36 (1997).
"' MARIA PRONK, HOMOSEXUALITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1985 IGA Pink
Book, 12, 17 (1985).
112 HEINZE, supra note 51, at 217.
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production marked by the union of gametes and that distinguish males and
females," as well as "sexually motivated phenomena or behavior."' 1 3
There are some early signs of acceptance for this kind of thinking.
In Toonen v. Australia, the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(HRC) considered Australia's question "whether sexual orientation may be
considered an 'other status' for the purposes of article 26."114 The HRC
stated, "[Tlhe reference to 'sex' in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to be
taken as including sexual orientation."' 115 Likewise, the United States Su-
preme Court (SCOTUS), in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
held that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimination
because of sex merely because the plaintiff and the defendant ... are of the
same sex."
116
Asylum laws have been used to help sexual minorities, but estab-
lishing a claim based on sexual minority discrimination can be challenging.
The UDHR asseverates, "Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in
other countries asylum from persecution." ' 1 7 But as human rights experts
David Weissbrodt and Connie de la Vega have observed, "Persecution for
membership in a particular social group is the least well defined or most
open-ended of the five grounds for refugee status." ' 1 8 The United States can
be a particularly difficult place for sexual minorities to establish asylum
claims, although it is possible. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for in-
stance, has "ruled that gay men in Mexico with female sexual identities
constitute a 'particular social group' for purposes of establishing eligibility
for asylum." 119
A recent example of the difficulty of establishing such an asylum
claim is the case of Mehdi Kazemi, a 19-year-old Iranian man who went to
London to study English in 2004 and subsequently discovered that his boy-
friend in Iran had been arrested by police, charged with sodomy, and
113 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 41, at 1140.
114 Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia (Communication No. 488/1992,
31 March 1994), at 8.7.
115 Id.
116 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
I" UDHR, supra note 29, art. 14.
118 DAVID WEISSBRODT & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 77 (2007).
"9 Id. at 77-78. See Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000).
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hanged. 120 Kazemi's father told him that before his April 2006 execution,
police questioned the boyfriend about his sexual relations with other men
and he named Kazemi as his partner. 12' Fearing his own arrest and execu-
tion if he returned to Iran, Kazemi applied for sanctuary in the United
Kingdom.
British courts refused to grant Kazemi asylum late in 2007, and he
fled Britain for Holland because the Netherlands has special protections for
gay Iranians. 22 But Dutch authorities detained Kazemi upon his arrival, and
on March 5, 2008, he appeared in a Dutch court asking not to be returned to
Britain. 123 The court ruled, however, that since Kazemi originally applied
for asylum in Britain, he had to return there. 24 Under tremendous public
and political pressure, the British government allowed him to return. 25
Sixty-three members of the House of Lords signed a letter to Home Secre-
tary Jacqui Smith, stating in part, "We are deeply concerned at the possible
execution of Mehdi Kazemi if he is refused asylum in the UK and is de-
ported to Iran."' 26 Lord Roberts of Llandudno wrote an article in The Inde-
pendent, in which he argued Kazemi's case:
Iran is a country where the penal code prescribes execution
by stoning and dictates the stones be large enough to cause
pain but not so large as to kill immediately. This is the law
of Iran. As such we cannot turn to the law of Iran to guide
us. Can we turn to international law?
The UN safeguards guaranteeing protection rights for those
facing the death penalty, clarified in Resolution 2005/59 of
the Commission on Human Rights, says clearly the death
penalty should not be imposed for non-violent acts such as
sexual relations between consenting adults.
120 See generally Robert Verkaik, A life or death decision, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar.
6, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/a-life-or-death-
decision-792058.html.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Luke Baker, Gay Iranian granted asylum reprieve, REUTERS UK, March 13,
2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/UKNewsl/idUKL1383983920080313.
125 Id.
126 Id.
239
240 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15
This is a matter of avoiding a breach of international law
but, more than that, it is a matter of not sending a 19-year-
old man, who has hurt nobody, to his death.
There is only one ethical course of action for the British
government to take. A moratorium on removals to Iran for
all those who fear execution.1 27
The Netherlands refused Kazemi's application because the 2003
Dublin Convention does not allow applications for asylum in more than one
European Union nation, but the reasons for the original British refusal of
Kazemi's application are unclear. Fortunately, the British government fi-
nally grasped the reality of Kazemi's situation and granted him asylum in
May 2008.128
OTHER RIGHTS
When considering the rights of sexual minorities, most judicial fora
have tended to use some combination of three clearly recognized funda-
mental rights: privacy, liberty, and equality.
Privacy
The UDHR and ICCPR establish the right to privacy as a norm of
international law, 29 and legal systems throughout the world enshrine a pri-
vacy right in their constitutions. An interesting exception is the United
States, where the Constitution contains no such explicit right. The right to
privacy was a subject of speculation and debate for many years until 1965,
when in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court recognized the right:
"[T]he First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from
governmental intrusion," wrote Justice William 0. Douglas. 130 Many of the
most important decisions of world courts affirming rights for sexual minori-
ties have been founded on the right to privacy.
The concept of a privacy right varies from place to place. Eric
Heinze, who has noted that the right differs in some aspects "[flrom culture
127 Lord Roberts of Llandudno: There is only one ethical course for the British
Government, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/
opinion/commentators/lord-roberts-of-Ilandudno-there-is-only-one-ethical-course-
for-the-british-govemment-801744.html.
128 Britain Grants Asylum to Gay Iranian Student, THE CNN WIRE, May 20, 2008,
http://cnnwire.blogs.cnn.com/2008/05/20/britain-grants-asylum-to-gay-iranian-
student/.
129 See UDHR, supra note 29, art. 12; ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 17.
130 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
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to culture,"'' has deduced two of its most common aspects: "a right to
choose the way in which, and the people with whom, one seeks to pursue
intimacy" and "a 'spatial aspect,' exemplified by, but not limited to, the
home."'132 Heinze contends that "these two aspects establish a comprehen-
sive zone of legal protections."' 133
The right to privacy has been used to justify decriminalizing homo-
sexual conduct. In the first important decision by the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) to recognize the rights of sexual minorities, Dudg-
eon v. United Kingdom, the Court held that Northern Ireland's laws
criminalizing homosexual acts infringed on Mr. Dudgeon's privacy
rights. 34 Likewise, in two succeeding cases, Norris v. Ireland and Modinos
v. Cyprus, the ECHR ruled against national laws and in favor of homosex-
ual petitioners on privacy grounds. 135
Dudgeon136 was the first major decision anywhere to affirm the
rights and protections of sexual minorities. The ECHR held that a "sodomy
law" criminalizing consensual homosexual conduct in Northern Ireland vio-
lated the privacy protections of Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The applicant, Jeffrey Dudgeon, was a thirty-five-year-old
homosexual shipping clerk who lived in Belfast. In January 1976, police
searched Mr. Dudgeon's flat in connection with a drug investigation, found
marijuana, and charged another person with drug crimes. But during the
search, police also discovered and seized personal papers belonging to
Dudgeon that described his homosexual activities, and questioned him
about his sex life for more than four hours. Authorities ultimately decided
not to bring charges, but did not inform Dudgeon of the decision or return
his papers until February 1977, thirteen months after the search.
Northern Ireland's statutes criminalizing homosexual acts between
consenting adult males dated from the nineteenth century. 137 The penalties
for infringement ranged from life imprisonment for "buggery" (anal inter-
131 HELNZE, supra note 51, at 172.
132 Id. at 173.
133 Id,
134 Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7525/76, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1981).
135 Norris v. Ireland, App. No. 10581/83 Eur. Ct. (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, App.
No. 15070/89 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1993). Both cases involved breaches of Article 8 of
the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which states in pertinent part,
"Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence."
136 Dudgeon, App. No. 7525/76 at 33.
137 Id. at 14. The Offences against the Person Act (1861) and the Criminal Law
Amendment Act (1885).
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course) to two years for "gross indecency" (oral sex or mutual masturba-
tion). Homosexual acts between females were not illegal. While the laws
originally applied throughout the United Kingdom, they were revoked eve-
rywhere except Northern Ireland in 1967. Dudgeon complained that under
the law of Northern Ireland, homosexual conduct could subject him to crim-
inal prosecution, and that he had resultantly experienced fear, suffering, and
psychological distress. This, he contended, constituted a breach of his pri-
vacy rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.' 38 The ECHR recognized that "the cardinal issue arising under Arti-
cle 8 ... is to what extent, if at all, the maintenance in force of the [dis-
puted] legislation is necessary in a democratic society for these aims." 139
The court found that there was no social need to justify "the risk of harm to
vulnerable sections of society," so the laws were not necessary. 140 "[T]he
reasons given by the Government ... are not sufficient to justify the main-
tenance in force of the impugned legislation in so far as it has the general
effect of criminalising private homosexual relations between adult males
capable of valid consent." Hence the ECHR found a breach of Article 8.141
The United States Supreme Court used a privacy theory in its rea-
soning in Lawrence v. Texas.142 "Liberty protects the person from unwar-
ranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places," wrote
Justice Anthony Kennedy. 143 He continued:
In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home.
And there are other spheres of our lives and existence,
outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of
thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.
138 Id. at 37. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4. Nov. 1950), E.T.S, as amended by Protocol No.
3, E.T.S. 45; Protocl No. 5, E.T.S. 55; Protocol No. 8 E.T.S. 118; and Protocol No.
11, E.T.S. 155; entered into forces 3 Sept. 1953 (Protocol No. 3 on 21 Sept. 1970,
Protocol No. 5 on 20 Dec. 1971, Protocol No. 8 on 1 Jan. 1990, Protocol 11 on 11
Jan. 1998).
139 Dudgeon, 7525/76 at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140 Id. at 60.
141 Id. at 63.
142 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
143 Id. at 562.
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The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its
spatial and more transcendent dimensions. 44
The reliance upon the right to privacy was explicit:
The [Griswold] Court described the protected interest as a
right to privacy and placed emphasis on the marriage rela-
tion and the protected space of the marital bedroom ...
After Griswold it was established that the right to make cer-
tain decisions regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the
marital relationship. 145
This discussion of privacy led the Court to conclude that "adults may
choose to enter upon [sexual] relationship[s] in the confines of their homes
and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons."' 146
The Court then stated, "When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a per-
sonal bond that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the fight to make this choice."'147
Courts have relied on the right to privacy to extend other protec-
tions to sexual minorities. In two cases, Lustig-Prean v. United Kingdom148
and Beckett v. United Kingdom,149 the ECHR considered Great Britain's
ban of homosexuals from the military and held that the ban violated the
privacy provisions of Article 8 of the European Convention. Lustig-Praen
and Beckett were homosexual members of the British armed forces. The
Ministry of Defense had a policy that excluded homosexuals from military
service, and during a police investigation of their sexuality, the men admit-
ted their sexual orientation and were discharged because of their
admissions.
The ECHR held that "the investigations by the military police into
the applicants' homosexuality, which included detailed interviews with
each of them and with third parties on matters relating to their sexual orien-
tation and practices ... constituted a direct interference with the applicants'
right to respect for their private lives."'' 50 In addition, it held that "[t]heir
consequent administrative discharge on the sole ground of their sexual ori-
144 Id.
45 Id. at 564-65.
146 Id. at 567.
147 Id.
148 Lustig-Praen v. United Kingdom, App. no. 31417/96 (1999).
149 Beckett v. United Kingdom, App. no. 32377/96 (1999).
150 Id. wat 64.
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entation also constituted an interference with that right."'' The Court ex-
pressly rejected the British government's argument that "the presence of...
homosexuals in the armed forces would have a substantial and negative
effect on [the military's] morale and ... effectiveness . .".. ,,5 The Court
stated: "To the extent that they represent a predisposed bias on the part of a
heterosexual majority ... these negative attitudes cannot, of themselves, be
considered... to amount to sufficient justification for the interferences with
the applicants' rights ... any more than [would] similar negative attitudes
towards those of a different race, origin or colour."' 53
In Goodwin v. United Kingdom154 and L v. United Kingdom, 55 two
transsexual women "claimed that the United Kingdom's refusal to change
their legal identities and papers to match their post-operative genders con-
stituted discrimination."' 15 6 The ECHR held there had been violations of the
applicants' rights to respect for their private lives and to marry, creating
violations of Articles 8 and 12 (right to marry) of the Convention. 57 The
Court found that, "[T]here are no significant factors of public interest to
weigh against the interest of this individual applicant in obtaining legal rec-
ognition of her gender re-assignment, . . . [and] [t]here has, accordingly,
been a failure to respect her right to private life in breach of Article 8 of the
Convention."158
Regarding the right to marry, the Court found that "it is artificial to
assert that post-operative transsexuals have not been deprived of the right to
marry as, according to law, they remain able to marry a person of their
former opposite sex. The applicant in this case lives as a woman, is in a
relationship with a man and would only wish to marry a man. She has no
possibility of doing so. In the Court's view, she may therefore claim that the
very essence of her right to marry has been infringed."' 159
Finally, in Van Kuck v. Germany,160 the ECHR decided a case in
which a transsexual woman's medical insurance company denied reim-
151 Id.
152 Id. at 88.
153 id. at 90.
154 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95 (2002).
155 I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94 (2002).
156 Resource Library for International Jurisprudence on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity, http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2007/07/11/global16374.
htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
157 Id.
158 I. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25680/94 at T 73.
159 Goodwin, App. No. 28957/95 at 1 101.
160 Van Kuck v. Germany, App. No. 35968/97 (2003).
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bursement for costs associated with sex-reassignment surgery. German
courts upheld the insurance company's denial, but the ECHR held that the
company's denials were violations of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention,
rights to a fair hearing and to private life. "[T]he very essence of the Con-
vention," the Court stated, is "respect for human dignity and human free-
dom, [and hence] protection is given to the right of transsexuals to personal
development and to physical and moral security. '16' The German courts, the
ECHR held, failed to respect "the applicant's freedom to define herself as a
female person, one of the most basic essentials of self-determination.'
' 62
Equal Treatment
The right of all people to equal treatment is fundamental. Equality
concepts have become virtually inseparable from the construct of a free
society since the ideal of equality emerged from an increased focus on ideas
of natural law in the eighteenth century. Article 1 of the Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen begins, "Men are born and remain free
and equal in rights."'' 63 The American Declaration of Independence and
Constitution are other important documents of that era that included the
fundamental precept of equal rights. In the years since, nations around the
world have adopted constitutional provisions and statutes guaranteeing
equal rights and equal protection to their citizens.
The IBHR embraces equality principles. The UDHR begins:
"Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inaliena-
ble rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world. . . ."164 It also declares:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights .... 165
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opin-
ion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.'
66
161 Id. at 69.
162 Id. at 73.
163 Originally "Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et gaux en droits." The
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen was approved by the French
National Assembly on August 26, 1789.
164 UDHR, supra note 29, pmbl.
165 Id. at art. 1.
166 Id. at art. 2.
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All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are enti-
tled to equal protection against any discrimination in viola-
tion of this Declaration and against any incitement to such
discrimination. 167
The UDHR makes several further references to equality, and both the
ICCPR and ICESCR contain comparable passages.1 68 The documents also
strictly limit states' abilities to restrict the equal protection. 69
Since the right to equal treatment is so well established, a discon-
certing question presents itself: how genuine, in reality, is anyone's right to
equal treatment when it is not extended to everyone? A right to equal treat-
ment either exists or not, and if it exists, it will apply to everyone; other-
wise, it is oxymoronic and self-contradictory. It seems absurd that some
states claiming to be committed to equal treatment nonetheless allow une-
qual treatment of sexual minorities. Such insincerity calls into question
whether a state is too pusillanimous to enforce its ideals or is simply disin-
genuous in its human rights proclamations.
The development of protections for sexual minorities under equal
treatment theories has largely come from case law, as citizens have chal-
lenged unjust situations and discriminatory statutes. Tribunals have been
slow to respond, but progress has been made. Law professor James Wilets
has identified three paradigms in which findings are made that equal rights
are violated vis-a-vis sexual minorities: (1) "if a state makes certain acts
between members of the same sex illegal while permitting the same acts
between heterosexuals;" (2) "if a state discriminates against sexual minori-
ties in its application of a law which is neutral on its face ... ;" and (3) "if
certain rights are granted ... or withheld from individuals on the basis of
their sexual orientation."'' 70
The first category, forbidding acts between same-sex partners that
are permitted between opposite-sex partners, is patently unequal treatment
that is difficult for states to justify if their laws have equal treatment guaran-
tees. A recent example is Lawrence v. Texas, 17 1 in which the United States
Supreme Court considered a challenge to a Texas statute that criminalized
167 Id. at art. 7.
168 ICCPR, supra note 30, pmbl, art. 2 1, 3, 26; ICESCR, supra note 31, pmbl,
art. 2 2.
169 ICCPR supra note 30, art. 4 2, art. 5; ICESCR, supra note 31, art. 4.
170 James D. Wilets, The Human Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Comparative and
International Law Perspective, 22 FALL HUM. RTS. 22, 24 (1995).
171 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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sodomy, but only when it involved same-sex partners. 72 Sodomy was not a
crime for opposite sex partners in Texas. The Court's majority struck down
the law on due process grounds, but Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion in which she found the statute unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds. 173 She stated, "Texas' sodomy law brands all homosex-
uals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for homosexuals to be
treated in the same manner as everyone else."'' 74 The state seemed to em-
brace this state of affairs, as O'Connor noted: "Texas itself has previously
acknowledged . . . that the law 'legally sanctions discrimination against
[homosexuals] in a variety of ways unrelated to the criminal law,' including
in the areas of 'employment, family issues, and housing.' "175
Texas attempted to justify the statute by using moral arguments, for
example, claiming that the statute discriminated not against homosexual
persons, but against homosexual conduct.176 Justice O'Connor countered:
"Texas' invocation of moral disapproval . . . proves nothing more than
Texas' desire to criminalize homosexual sodomy."'177 She observed that
moral disapproval was not sufficient justification for the statute, and that
"legal classifications must not be drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging
the group burdened by the law."' 178 She convincingly dismissed the "con-
duct discrimination" claim, using a quotation from Justice Antonin Scalia's
dissent in Romer v. Evans: "[T]here can hardly be more palpable discrimi-
nation against a class than making the conduct that defines the class crimi-
nal."' 79 Recognizing that a serious problem with such a discriminatory
statute is the example it sets for the state's citizens, Justice O'Connor ob-
served that the state's discrimination "in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres."' 180
172 Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a) (Vernon 2007).
173 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 581.
175 Id. at 581-82 (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203 (Tex. App.
1992)).
176 Id. at 583.
177 Id.
178 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
179 Id. (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 641 (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (quoting Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (1987)).
180 Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (majority opinion) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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The second category involves a facially neutral law that is discrimi-
natorily applied against sexual minorities. Bowers v. Hardwick,"81 the deci-
sion the United States Supreme Court overruled in Lawrence v. Texas,
provides an example of such a situation. In Bowers, Georgia challenged a
decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals holding that Georgia's
anti-sodomy statute was unconstitutional.1 82 The Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit, but in his dissent, Justice Harry Blackmun disagreed
with the Court's refusal to consider whether the statute violated federal
equal protection guarantees. 183 Justice Blackmun noted, "Georgia's exclu-
sive stress before this Court on its interest in prosecuting homosexual activ-
ity despite the gender-neutral terms of the statute may raise serious
questions of discriminatory enforcement . . . . The legislature having de-
cided that the sex of the participants is irrelevant to the legality of the acts, I
do not see why the State can defend § 16-6-2 on the ground that individuals
singled out for prosecution are of the same sex as their partners."' 184
The third category of equal treatment violations concerns situations
in which "certain rights are granted ... or withheld from individuals on the
basis of their sexual orientation."' 18 5 This is the kind of discrimination the
United Nations Human Rights Committee addressed in Toonen v. Austra-
lia.186 Australian citizen Nicholas Toonen submitted a communication to
the HRC in 1991, challenging portions of the Tasmanian Criminal Code
(Sections 122(a) and (c), and 123), which "criminalize[d] various forms of
sexual contacts between men, including all forms of sexual contacts be-
tween consenting adult homosexual men in private." No sexual contacts
between "consenting homosexual women" were criminalized. 87 Toonen ar-
gued that the Tasmanian statutes violated articles 2, 17, and 26 of the
ICCPR. Specifically, he argued that his right to privacy was violated, and
that the statutes "distinguish[ed] between individuals in the exercise of their
181 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
182 See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1204 n.l (11th Cir. 1985). The chal-
lenged statute was O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2, which stated, in relevant part, "A person
commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual
act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."
183 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184 Id. at 203 n.2.
185 Wilets, supra note 170, at 24.
186 Human Rights Committee, Toonen v. Australia (Communication No. 488/1992,
31 March 1994).
187 Human Rights Committee, supra note 186, at 3.1(c).
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right to privacy on the basis of sexual activity, sexual orientation and sexual
identity."1 88
Australia seemed to want the Tasmanian statutes overturned. The
HRC stated:
The State party did not challenge the.., communication on
any grounds, [and] . . . notes that the laws challenged by
Mr. Toonen are those of the state of Tasmania and only
apply within the jurisdiction of that state. Laws similar to
those challenged by the author once applied in other Aus-
tralian jurisdictions but have since been repealed. 89
The HRC also noted that Australia "contends that there is now a general
Australian acceptance that no individual should be disadvantaged on the
basis of his or her sexual orientation."' 190 In addition, "IT]he State party
acknowledges that a complete prohibition on sexual activity between men is
unnecessary to sustain the moral fabric of Australian society."' 19 Regarding
the issue of equal protection, the HRC noted that "the State party acknowl-
edges that if the Committee were to find the laws to be discriminatory, they
would discriminate in the right to equal protection of the law."' 92
The Committee affirmed that "adult consensual sexual activity in
private is covered by the concept of 'privacy,"' and that the disputed stat-
utes "'interfere[d]' with [Toonen's] privacy."' 93 In a significant holding, the
HRC also decided Australia's question "whether sexual orientation may be
considered an 'other status' for the purposes of article 26."' 94 The Commit-
tee found that "the reference to 'sex' in articles 2, paragraph 1, and 26 is to
be taken as including sexual orientation."1 95
Unfortunately, because the Committee held that Toonen's rights
were violated under articles 17(1) and 2(1), it did "not consider it necessary
to consider whether there has also been a violation of article 26."196 But
HRC member Bertil Wennergren issued an individual opinion concerning
the equal treatment issue, in which he stated that the disputed Tasmanian
laws indeed violated "equality before the law" because they "ma[de] a dis-
188 Id. at 3.1(b).
189 Id. at [ 4.1-4.2.
190 Id. at 6.7.
91 Id.
192 Id. at 6.14.
193 Id. at 8.2.
194 Id. at 8.7.
195 Id. (emphasis added).
196 Id. at 11.
250 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15
tinction between heterosexuals and homosexuals . . . [and] they criminal-
ize[d] ... sexual contacts between consenting men without at the same time
criminalizing such contacts between women."' 9 7
A different paradigm implicating equal treatment rights was the
subject of the American case Romer v. Evans, which involved a law de-
signed to harm a particular group, sexual minorities. 198 After various Colo-
rado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on
sexual orientation, Colorado voters, in a 1992 referendum, adopted a state
constitutional amendment that prohibited all legislative, executive, or judi-
cial action designed to protect homosexual persons from discrimination
based on their "homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, prac-
tices or relationships."'' 99 A Colorado state court granted a permanent in-
junction enjoining enforcement of the amendment, which the Colorado
Supreme Court affirmed.
In its decision, SCOTUS held that the amendment violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. "We must con-
clude that [the amendment] classifies homosexuals not to further a proper
legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado
cannot do. A State cannot so deem a class of persons a stranger to its
laws." 200
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, writing for the Court's majority,
opened the opinion by quoting the first Justice John Harlan: "[T]he Consti-
tution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. '20 1 Justice Ken-
nedy stated that "those words now are understood to state a commitment to
the law's neutrality where the rights of persons are at stake. '202 He ex-
plained the fundamental standard by which the Court analyzes such laws:
"[Because] most legislation classifies for one purpose or
another, with resulting disadvantage to various groups or
persons .... [] [w]e have attempted to reconcile the [equal-
ity] principle with the reality by stating that, if a law neither
burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
197 Id. at Appendix (Individual opinion by Mr. Bertil Wennergren).
198 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
199 Id. at 624 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Colo. Const., art. II
§ 30b).
200 Id. at 635-36.
201 Id. at 623 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
202 Id.
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will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears
a rational relation to some legitimate end. 20 3
The Colorado amendment, Justice Kennedy observed, "fails, indeed defies,
even this conventional inquiry. '204 The amendment "is at once too narrow
and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them
protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of per-
sons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is unprece-
dented in our jurisprudence. 20 5
Colorado attempted to defend the amendment by arguing that it was
not discriminatory but merely "den[ied] homosexuals special rights," and
"put[ ] gays and lesbians in the same position as all other persons. '20 6 Jus-
tice Kennedy rejected this argument, stating delicately, "This reading of the
amendment's language is implausible. 20 7
The Court seemed appalled by the amendment's unabashed hateful-
ness, remarking,
"It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort. Central both to the idea of the rule of law and to
our own Constitution's guarantee of equal protection is the
principle that government and each of its parts remain open
on impartial terms to all who seek its assistance. 20 8
Furthermore, "in making a general announcement that gays and lesbians
shall not have any particular protections from the law, [the amendment]
inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and
belie any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it." °20 9 Finally, "If
the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means any-
thing, it must at the very least mean that a bare ... desire to harm a politi-
cally unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest." 210
203 Id. at 631.
204 Id. at 632.
205 Id. at 633.
206 Id. at 626.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 633.
209 Id. at 635.
210 Id. at 634 (emphasis added) (quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413
U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
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Another interesting case implicating equal treatment rights is
Karner v. Austria.21I After the Austrian Supreme Court denied a homosex-
ual man the right to continue living in his deceased partner's apartment, he
appealed to the ECHR. The Austrian Court had held that "'life companion'
(Lebensgefdhrte) in section 14(3) of the Rent Act was to be interpreted as at
the time it was enacted, and the legislature's intention in 1974 was not to
include persons of the same sex.'"212 The ECHR held that this interpretation
violated the nondiscrimination protections of Article 14 of the Conven-
tion.213 "Just like differences based on sex, differences based on sexual ori-
entation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification," the
Court stated.214
Liberty
Liberty may be variously defined as "the quality or state of being
free . . . the power to do as one pleases .. .freedom from arbitrary or
despotic control ... the positive enjoyment of various social, political, or
economic rights and privileges ... the power of choice. ' 215 Black's Law
Dictionary defines "liberty" as "[f]reedom from arbitrary or undue external
restraint, esp[ecially] by a government. ' 216 Liberty's place as an interna-
tional norm is reflected in the UDHR, "Everyone has the right to life, lib-
erty and security of person. '217 It is also guaranteed in the ICCPR,
"Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person .... No one shall
be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law. '218 In the United States, the secur-
ity of liberty was a basic reason for adopting the Constitution, as stated in
the Preamble, and liberty is further guaranteed in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Liberty grants the fundamental human right to choose whether,
how, and when to be intimate with another person. "When sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can
211 Kamer v. Austria, App. No. 40016/98 (2003).
212 Id. at 15.
213 Id. at 43. See The European Convention on Human Rights and its Five Proto-
cols, supra note 138, art. 14 states, "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set
forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
214 Id. at 37.
215 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 41, at 716.
216 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 937 (8th ed. 2004).
217 UDHR, supra note 29, art. 3.
218 ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 9.
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be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make
this choice. '219
Liberty cannot be unconstrained, however. So that maximal liberty
may exist for everyone, no one is able to enjoy absolute liberty. Eric Heinze
defines conditions of liberty: "the liberty to exercise one's rights only to the
degree that the rights of others (third parties) are not harmed," and "the
concomitant liberty to exercise one's rights without the burden of illegiti-
mate claims of harm on the part of third parties. '22 0 These constraints have
been the source of considerable legal argument, and in relation to sexual
minorities the arguments have tended to focus on morality concerns. The
question usually is whether, or to what extent, a state may legislate moral-
ity. 22' Heinze poses the question more specifically as, "[W]hether a moral
sentiment alone provides an adequate basis for curtailing rights.
222
Justice John Paul Stevens's dissenting opinion in Bowers v. Hard-
wick provides a strong answer to this question:
[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradi-
tionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the prac-
tice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibit-
ing miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second,
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the in-
timacies of their physical relationship, even when not in-
tended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate
choices by unmarried as well as married persons.
223
Liberty interests were important in Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,224 the historic case in which the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court held that the state could not "deny the protections, benefits, and
obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same sex
219 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
220 HEINZE, supra note 51, at 187.
221 Id. at 191.
222 Id. at 191.
223 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (cita-
tions omitted).
224 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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who wish to marry. '225 Chief Justice Margaret H. Marshall wrote for the
Court's majority:
"[In Lawrence, the United States Supreme Court] affirmed
that the core concept of common human dignity protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution precludes government intrusion into the deeply per-
sonal realms of consensual adult expressions of intimacy
and one's choice of an intimate partner. The Court also re-
affirmed the central role that decisions whether to marry or
have children bear in shaping one's identity. 226
Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he Massachusetts Constitution is, if
anything, more protective of individual liberty and equality than the Federal
Constitution; it may demand broader protection for fundamental rights; and
it is less tolerant of government intrusion into the protected spheres of pri-
vate life. '227 The decision spoke of marriage's benefits to all the commu-
nity, including that "[c]ivil marriage anchors an ordered society by
encouraging stable relationships over transient ones. '228 Marriage, the deci-
sion expounds, is "at once a deeply personal commitment to another human
being and a highly public celebration of the ideals of mutuality, companion-
ship, intimacy, fidelity, and family. 229
Justice Marshall acknowledged that "[t]he benefits accessible only
by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every aspect of
life and death. The department states that 'hundreds of statutes' are related
to marriage and to marital benefits. '230 She also observed, "Without the
right to marry-or more properly, the right to choose to marry-one is
excluded from the full range of human experience and denied full protec-
tion of the laws for one's 'avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting
human relationship.' "231The Court's decision concluded: "We declare that
barring an individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil
marriage solely because that person would marry a person of the same sex
violates the Massachusetts Constitution. 232
225 Id. at 948.
226 Id. at 948-49.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 954.
229 Id.
230 Id. at 955.
231 Id. at 326 (quoting Baker v. State, 170 Vt. 194, 229 (Vt. 1999)).
232 Id. at 969.
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Sexual Orientation as a Fundamental Human Right
While many people might agree that sexual minorities are entitled
to the same rights as everyone else, and that existing rights could be ex-
panded to include the right to have sexual relationships with other con-
senting adults, another question still looms: whether the right to one's
sexual identity is fundamental. Many people would perceive this simply as
a right to live life as a person feels she must, and answer the question posi-
tively. But others might answer negatively, arguing that being a sexual mi-
nority is not a valid life choice. This kind of thinking leads to circuitous
debates about nature-versus-nurture, religion, and morality. Put simply,
many people believe that the right to be one's self, sexually, is the right to
be an authentic person, a complete human being.
Science cannot yet tell us what determines a person's gender iden-
tity or sexual orientation, or whether sexual identity is innate or acquired.
Obsessing about this conundrum is futile and misses the essential point:
fundamental human rights exist for everyone regardless of any other con-
sideration. Because sexual minorities are people, they are entitled to funda-
mental human rights. Furthermore, regardless of whether a non-
heterosexual or atypical identity is innate or acquired, sexual identity is one
of a human being's most personal and essential characteristics. Therefore,
as long as a person's identity manifests as individual behavior or consensual
behavior between adults-just as heterosexual behavior must-this most
personal and essential characteristic should be protected as a fundamental
right. After all, if sexual identity is innate, it is something about which a
person has no choice. And if it is acquired, it is part of a person's thoughts
and is reflected in his opinions and expressions, and should not be subject
to regulation. Articles 18 and 19 of the UDHR guarantee freedom of
thought, opinion, and expression.233
The United States Supreme Court missed this point in 1986, when
it characterized the issue in Bowers v. Hardwick: "[R]espondent would have
us announce ... a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. '234
Justice Harry Blackmun understood better, demonstrated by his dissent:
"This case is no more about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual
sodomy' . . . than Stanley v. Georgia was about a fundamental right to
watch obscene movies .... Rather, this case is about the most comprehen-
233 UDHR, supra note 29, art. 18: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion .... "; art. 19: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without inter-
ference .... "
234 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
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sive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men, namely, the right
to be let alone." 235 When the Court overruled Bowers seventeen years later,
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, "Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds
... [and] presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. '236 Freedom is a constant
theme throughout human rights documents. The freedom to be one's self in
both innate and acquired ways is certainly a fundamental cornerstone of
human rights.
V. EXISTING LAWS AND SEXUAL MINORITIES
Despite slow signs of progress, the expansion of existing rights
does not appear to be a satisfactory solution for sexual minorities' rights. As
Canadian law professor Douglas Sanders observes, "A general approach to
discrimination has not been characteristic of international human rights
law .... Only through invoking provisions on personal privacy and certain
general provisions on equality have lesbians and gay men been able to gain
some recognition. '237
The rights in question cover a broad spectrum. Discrimination often
manifests as the deprivation of one or more of these rights: equality in and
before the law; equality of age of consent for same-sex relationships; free-
dom from violence and harassment; right to life; freedom from torture or
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; protection from arbitrary arrest;
freedom of movement; right to a fair trial; right to privacy; rights to free-
dom of expression and association; free practice of religion; right to work
and equality of employment opportunities; rights to social security, assis-
tance, and benefits; right to physical and mental health and health care;
right to form a family; protection for children against separation from par-
ents; and the right to education or to equality of opportunities in
education. 238
235 Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations and punctuation marks omitted)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting). Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that a state had no inter-
est in mere possession of obscenity in one's own home, and that a statute
forbidding such possession was invalid because it violated the first and fourteenth
amendments in that it was an attempt to control a person's private thoughts).
236 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
237 Douglas Sanders, Human Rights and Sexual Orientation in International Law,
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, July 17,
2005, para. 1, http://www.ai-lgbt.org/resources-other.htm.
238 HREA.org, Sexual Orientation and Human Rights, http://www.hrea.org/index.
php?base-id=161 (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
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Given the breadth and weight of this partial list, it is incomprehen-
sible why so many governments fail to do more to guarantee these rights.
All are basic, fundamental rights-rights that no one would want taken
away. To ensure that they are available to all members of society does not
constitute giving a particular group "special rights," which is a favorite ar-
gument of those who oppose the end of discrimination against sexual mi-
norities. 239 Ensuring that the rights are available to everyone, regardless of
sexual orientation, is simply ensuring that everyone has the same rights and
opportunities.
The enactment and enforcement of laws explicitly forbidding dis-
crimination based on sexual identity is an important step to eradicating
homophobia. Some people may question why, and may believe that the key
to real progress is not passing laws but changing hearts and minds. Martin
Luther King, Jr., wrote: "It may be true that the law cannot make a man
love me, but it can keep him from lynching me, and I think that's pretty
important." 240 Sadly, the law did not protect Dr. King in the end, but his
words were about protecting an entire group from societal discrimination.
In the United States, it took the adoption of laws forbidding discrimination
and hate crimes against African-Americans, and expressly guaranteeing
equal treatment in various areas of life, before any consistent progress was
made toward eliminating racial discrimination. In South Africa, a new gov-
ernment was necessary to begin ridding that country of horrendous racial
discrimination. Whether those affected were women, Aboriginal peoples,
racial minorities, religious minorities, or sexual minorities, proactive and
affirmative legislation has repeatedly proven to be the successful way to
begin a corrective process. Laws express the expectations and aspirations of
society. Firm laws protecting sexual minorities from discrimination and
guaranteeing equal treatment would make it more difficult for those op-
posed to such equality to justify their actions, and it would set an expecta-
tion for the way civilized members of society should behave.
For sexual minorities, discrimination is the heart of the problem
that must be addressed to enable consistent advancement toward equality.
Martin Luther King's words are again apropos, this time in paraphrase: Dis-
crimination is a hellhound gnawing at sexual minorities in every waking
moment of their lives to remind them that the lie of their inferiority is ac-
239 See generally, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
240 Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Western Michigan University (December
18, 1963), available at http://www.wmich.edu/library/archives/mk/transcription.
html.
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cepted as truth in the society dominating them.24' When sexual minorities
are accorded their rights as human beings, and when they are allowed to
live with dignity and security, everyone will benefit. The transgender peo-
ple and non-heterosexuals will live fuller, more authentic lives, and will be
able to focus on contributing positively to the world around them. And
without the need to expend so much energy to maintain separation from
sexual minorities, the rest of the world will be able to focus better on solv-
ing problems and increasing the quality of life for everyone.
NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS
Explicit nondiscrimination protection for sexual minorities in na-
tional constitutions is a rarity. South Africa became the first nation to pro-
vide such protection with the adoption of its new constitution in 1996.
Section 9 declares:
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indi-
rectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion,
conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth.
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indi-
rectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of
subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to pre-
vent or prohibit unfair discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in
subsection (3) is unfair unless it is established that the dis-
crimination is fair.242
It is exciting not only that sexual orientation is included among the
impressive list of protected categories in subsection 3, but also that the Con-
stitution offers such protection from the state as well as individual persons
(subsections 3 and 4). The South African Constitutional Court website ex-
plains, "Just as [the Constitution] specifically mentions race and ethnicity in
response to South Africa's past, sexual orientation is included because of
241 See Martin Luther King, Jr., Keynote Address at the Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference: Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or Community? (Aug. 16,
1967) (noting "[d]iscrimination is a hellhound that gnaws at Negroes in every wak-
ing moment of their lives to remind them that the lie of their inferiority is accepted
as truth in the society dominating them.").
242 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 § 9 (emphasis
added), available at http://www.concourt.gov.za/text/constitution/text/index.html.
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the injustices gay and lesbian people have suffered. '243 After South Africa,
the next two nations to modify their constitutions to include nondiscrimina-
tion protection for sexual minorities were Fiji (1997) and Ecuador (1998).244
Europe currently leads the world in providing constitutional protec-
tions for sexual minorities. Constitutional protection for sexual orientation
has existed in Switzerland since 2000245 Sweden has constitutional protec-
tion for sexual orientation,246 as well as antidiscrimination statutes; 247 in ad-
dition, gay partnerships have the same rights as heterosexual marriage,
including adoption. 248 Portugal instituted constitutional protection for sex-
ual orientation in 2004.249 Article 24 of Kosovo's new 2008 constitution
includes protection for sexual orientation. 250 Sexual orientation is also pro-
tected in the constitutions of Canada and parts of Brazil. 251
STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS
According to the International Lesbian and Gay Association, fifty
nations had laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in
May 2008.252 Hate crime laws, although common throughout the world,
243 Constiutional Court of South Africa, Gay and Lesbian Rights, http://www.
concourt.gov.za/text/rights/know/homosexual.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
244 Holning Lau, Sexual Orientation: Testing the Universality of International
Human Rights Law, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1689, 1703 (2004).
245 OTTOSSON, supra note 105, at 47.
246 Id.
247 Id. See also KEES WAALDIJK & MATrEO BONINI-BARALDI, SEXUAL ORIENTA-
TION DISCRIMINATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: NATIONAL LAWS & THE EMPLOY-
MENT EQUALITY DIRECTIVE 69 (2006); Sexual Orientation Discrimination
(Employment) Act (1999:133), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/574/a/
104989.
248 3 ch. 4 § Registration of Partnership Act (1994:1117), available at http://www.
homo.se/o.o.i.s/1630. See also Ministry of Justice, Sweden, Fact Sheet: Homosex-
ual Partnership & Adoption (2003), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/
2768/a/16217.
249 OTTOSSON, supra note 105, at 47. See also International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Trans and Intersex Association, Portugal's constitution bans discrimination based
on sexual orientation, http://www.ilga.org/news-results.asp?LanguagelD= l&File
Category=l&FilelD=289 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
250 Kosovo CONST. 2008 art. 28, available at http://www.kosovoconstitution.info/
?cid=2,300.
251 OTrOSSON, supra note 105, at 47.
252 See International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, http:/
/www.ilga.org/map/LGBTI-rights.jpg (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
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seem notoriously difficult to track. The Human Rights First Hate Crime
Report Card (2007)253 notes that, "Most countries that publish hate crime
data report on the incidence of 'racist' crime, yet other types of violent bias
crimes that are not racist, or in which racism is only one element-such as
violence motivated by religious intolerance, sexual orientation, and disabil-
ity-are more rarely reported in official statistics. '254 According to the re-
port, more than thirty of the reporting countries have "legislation [that]
treats bias-motivated violent crime as a separate crime or in which bias is
regarded as an aggravating circumstance that can result in enhanced penal-
ties. '255 Only eleven of the thirty have sexual orientation as one of the bias
types covered by a provision on aggravating circumstances. 256 Twenty-three
of the countries "still have no express provisions defining bias as an aggra-
vating circumstance in the commission of a range of violent crimes against
persons. '257 Surprisingly, many of these nations are nations that have non-
discrimination laws.
The Human Rights First 2008 Hate Crime Survey258 reports that
hate crimes "based on sexual orientation and gender identity ... [are] an
intimidating day-to-day reality for people across Europe and North
America. '259 Such crimes constitute "a significant portion of violent hate
crimes overall and are characterized by levels of serious physical violence
that in some cases exceed those present in other types of hate crimes. 260
Sadly, "[n]one of the official reports suggest that incidents are decreasing;
government data in some countries, as well as credible nongovernmental
reports, suggest an increase. 261
253 Overview: Hate Crime Report Card, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Human Rights
First, Washington, D.C.), 2007, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
discrimination/pages.aspx?id=78.
254 Id. at iv.
255 Id.
256 Id. at vii. The 11 nations are Andorra, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark,
France, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.
257 Id. at iv. The 23 nations are Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, San Marino,
Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, and Turkey.
258 2008 Hate Crime Survey, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, (Human Rights First, Wash-
ington, D.C.), 2008, available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/discriminnation/
pages.aspxid=78.
259 Id. at 127.
260 Id.
261 Id.
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Outside the United States
Currently, six nations have same-sex marriage: Belgium, Canada,
Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, and Spain. 262 Four additional nations
recognize same-sex marriages performed elsewhere, but do not perform
them: Aruba, France, Israel, and Netherlands Antilles. 263 Sixteen nations
have civil unions or domestic partnerships that confer the rights and bene-
fits of marriage but call it something else.264 In addition, Argentina, Austra-
lia, Brazil, and Mexico recognize civil unions or domestic partnerships in
some regions.265
Numerous countries have voluntarily decriminalized homosexuality
or enacted statutory protections that prohibit discrimination against sexual
minorities. Some examples follow.
In a 1992 referendum, seventy-three percent of Swiss voters ac-
cepted the reform of Swiss Federal legislation on sexual offenses, including
the elimination of "all discrimination against homosexuality from the Penal
Code. '266 Israel is the only Asian nation to provide genuine legal protec-
tions for sexual minorities, with its 1992 legislation that prohibited employ-
ment discrimination based on sexual orientation.2 67 Homosexuals have been
allowed to serve openly in the military since 1993.268 In 2005, the Israeli
Supreme Court held that a lesbian couple could legally adopt one another's
children. 269
262 Kevin Bourassa & Joe Varnell, Norway's Expansion of Human Rights: Six
Countries Now Support Equal Marriage, EQUAL MARRIAGE FOR SAME SEX
COUPLES, June 17, 2008, available at http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/equality/
norl70608.htm.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Alan Reekie, European International Control, in SOCIOLEGAL CONTROL OF Ho-
MOSEXUALITY: A MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 179, 189 (Donald J. West & Rich-
ard Green eds., 1997).
267 Alon Harel, Overview & Commentary: Bagaz 721/94 El-Al v. Danilowitz and
the Future of Sexual Minority Rights in Israel, 1 NAT'L. J. SEX. ORIENT. L. 302,
303 (1995), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/gaylaw/issue2/harel.html.
268 Itamar Eichner, Follow Israel's Example on Gays in the Military, US Study
Says, YNETNEWS, Feb. 8, 2007, available at http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/
0,7340,L-3362505,00.html.
269 Yaros-Hakak v. Attorney General, C.A. 10280/01 (2005).
262 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15
The Czech Republic legalized most consensual homosexual activity
in 1961 .270 The age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual activities
were equalized in 1990, and homosexual prostitution was decriminalized
the same year.27 1 Homosexuals are allowed to serve openly in the Czech
military. 272 The 2001 Labor Code prohibits sexual orientation discrimina-
tion,273 and civil unions for same-sex couples were legalized in 2006.274
Denmark legalized homosexuality in 1933275 and became the first nation to
legalize same-sex unions in 1989.276 Homosexuals have served openly in
the military since 1978,277 anti-discrimination laws cover sexual orienta-
tion,278 gay adoption is allowed,2 79 and hate crime legislation includes
crimes based on sexual orientation.280 Finland decriminalized homosexual
acts in 1971, legalized same-sex unions in 2002, outlawed discrimination
based on sexual orientation in 1995, anti-discrimination laws cover sexual
orientation, and allow homosexuals to serve openly in the military. 281
France decriminalized homosexuality in 1789 and enacted antidis-
crimination legislation in 1985.282 Homosexuals may serve in the French
270 Ivo Prochdizka, The Czech & Slovak Republics, in SOCIOLEGAL CONTROL OF
HOMOSEXUALITY: A MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 243, 246 (Donald J. West &
Richard Green, eds., 1997).
271 Id.
272 New Data Analysis Finds American Policy Out of Step with Other Democratic
Nations, PALM CENTER: BLUEPRINTS FOR SOUND POLICY, Mar. 17, 2003, http://
www.palmcenter.org/press/dadt/releases/russia-joins u-s-turkey-inbarring-gays
_frommilitary-service.
273 WAALDIJK & BONINI-BARALDI, supra note 247, at 150.
274 Timeline: Legal progress for same-sex couples, REUTERS UK, Nov. 12, 2008,
available at http://uk.reuters.com/article/buminglssues/idUKTRE4AB6CO2008111
2?pageNumber=l&virtualBrandChannel=0. The Czech House of Representatives
passed the civil union bill on December 16, 2005, and the Senate passed it on
January 26, 2006. The President vetoed the bill, but on March 15, 2006, the House
of Representatives overturned the President's veto.
275 OTrOSSON, supra note 105, at 45.
276 Reekie, supra note 266, at 190.
277 DANIEL OTrOSSON, LGBT WORLD LEGAL WRAP UP 8 (2006), available at
http://www.ilga-europe.org/Europe/Issues/International/LGBT-world-legal-wrap-
up-survey-November-2006.
278 Reekie, supra note 266, at 189-90. See also Id. at 6-7.
279 OrrossoN, supra note 277, at 5.
280 Id. at 7.
281 Id. at 3, 5-8.
282 Id. at 3, 6-7.
2009 SEXUAL IDENTITY AS A HUMAN RIGHT
military and hate crime laws apply to sexual orientation-based crimes. 283
Civil Solidarity Pacts (domestic partnerships) were enacted for all couples,
of whatever sexual orientation, in 1999, and discrimination based on sexual
orientation is against the law. 284 Hungary legalized homosexual conduct in
1962.285 The Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled in 1999 that the constitu-
tional ban on discrimination covers sexual orientation. 286 This antidis-
crimination law was added to Hungarian statutes in 2004.287 Iceland
repealed anti-homosexuality laws in 1940, and instituted same-sex civil un-
ions in 1996.288 Same-sex couples have been allowed to adopt children
since 2006.289 Iceland has statutes against discrimination based on sexual
orientation, and hate crime laws cover crimes based on sexual
orientation. 290
Two of the most liberal nations regarding rights of sexual minori-
ties are the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Sexual minorities in the
Netherlands enjoy a full spectrum of rights and protections. The Nether-
lands decriminalized homosexuality in 1811291 with the General Equal
Treatment Act of 1994 that included sexual orientation as a protected cate-
gory. 292 In 2001, the Netherlands became the first country in the world to
recognize same-sex marriage. 293 In the United Kingdom, the 2004 Civil
Partnership Act created a parallel legal structure to marriage under which
homosexual couples have all the rights and responsibilities of marriage.
294
283 Id. at 7-8.
284 Id. at 5-7.
285 OrrossoN, supra note 105, at 45.
286 Lilla Farkas, Nice on Paper: The Aborted Liberalisation of Gay Rights in Hun-
gary, in LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NA-
TIONAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 563, 563 n.2 (Mads Andenas &
Robert Wintemute eds., 2001). See generally 20/1999 (VI.25.) AB hatdrozat, avail-
able at http://www.mkab.hu/en/enpage3.htm.
287 O-rrossoN, supra note 277, at 6-7.
288 Id. at 3, 5.
289 Id. at 5.
290 Id. at 7.
291 OTrOSSON, supra note 105, at 45.
292 Kees Waaldijk, Others May Follow: The Introduction of Marriage, Quasi-Mar-
riage, and Semi-Marriage for Same-Sex Couples in European Countries, 38 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 569, 578 (2004).
293 Id. at 572.
294 See Directgov, Marriage, Cohabitation and Civil Partnerships, http://www.
direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/Yourrightsandresponsibilities/DG-
10026937 (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). For the text of the Act, refer to Civil Partner-
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The Gender Recognition Act of 2004 legalized a process for transgender
people to change their gender and have their acquired gender legally recog-
nized.295 The United Kingdom legally protects sexual minorities in virtually
every way imaginable.
New Zealand decriminalized homosexuality in 1986,296 and the
1993 Human Rights Act prohibits discrimination on grounds of sexual ori-
entation. 297 The Civil Union Act of 2004 established civil unions for same-
sex and opposite-sex couples. 298 In addition, the New Zealand High Court
ruled in 1994 that post-operative transsexuals could marry as their new
sex.
2 99
Decriminalization of homosexual conduct has often been accom-
plished by court decisions. For example, in National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice ,30 the Constitutional Court of South
Africa unanimously overturned laws criminalizing homosexual conduct.
The Court held that such laws violated privacy protections as well as princi-
ples of equality and dignity. "In eloquent language, both the majority opin-
ion and a concurrent opinion affirmed that respecting gay and lesbian
equality and dignity was a key aspect of overcoming South Africa's repres-
sive past."'30
The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and the South
African Human Rights Commission sought an order declaring two common
ship Act 2004 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/ukpga-
20040033_en_1.
295 See Department for Constitutional Affairs, Legislation: The Gender Recogni-
tion Act 2004, http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/legs.htm. For the text of
the Act (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). For the text of the Act, refer to Gender Recog-
nition Act 2004 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/ukpga-
20040007_en_1.
296 OrroSSON, supra note 105, at 45.
297 Changes to the Human Rights Act 1993: Guidelines for the Health and Disabil-
ity Sector, Ministry of Health 8 (2002), http://www.moh.govt.nz/moh.nsf/82f4
780aa066f8d7cc2570bb006b5d4d/3a40e840a 185a151 cc256bfa0073bcda/$FILE/
human-rights-act.pdf.
298 Civil Union, The Department of Internal Affairs, http://www.dia.govt.nz/
diawebsite.nsf/wpgURL/Services-Births-Deaths-and-Marriages-Civil-Union?
OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
299 New Zealand Attorney General v. Family Court at Otahuhu, [1991], CP787/91
(H.C.), available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/node/371.
300 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, 1998
(12) BCLR 1517 (CC) [hereinafter National Coalition I].
301 Resource Library for International Jurisprudence on Sexual Orientation and
Gender Idenity, supra note 156.
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law sodomy offenses and certain statutory provisions that criminalized sex-
ual acts between males to be unconstitutional. The Court noted that in tradi-
tional South African law, certain sexual acts between males constituted
illegal sodomy, consent notwithstanding, but the same acts were legal when
the participants were a consenting male and female. 302 The Court concluded
that this constituted discrimination because of sexual orientation, 30 3 and
stated that this discrimination "reinforce[d] already existing societal
prejudices and severely increase[d] the negative effects of such prejudices
on their lives. ' '304 In addition, "[t]he impact of discrimination on gays and
lesbians is rendered more serious and their vulnerability increased by the
fact that they are a political minority not able on their own to use political
power to secure favourable legislation for themselves. 30 5
Referring to the fact that gay men were particularly singled out in
the sodomy laws, the Court observed, "[g]ay men are a permanent minority
in society and have suffered in the past from patterns of disadvantage. The
impact is severe, affecting the dignity, personhood and identity of gay men
at a deep level. It occurs at many levels and in many ways and is often
difficult to eradicate. '' 30 6 The Court appeared to have trouble understanding
the supposed justification for the law: "It has no other purpose than to
criminalise conduct which fails to conform with the moral or religious
views of a section of society. . . . [Such] discrimination has . . . gravely
affected the rights and interests of gay men and deeply impaired their fun-
damental dignity. '307 Ultimately, it held that the discriminatory laws
breached sections 9 and 10 of the 1996 Constitution. 30 8
In South America, the Brazilian states of Alagoas, Distrito Federal,
Mato Grosso, Pardi, Santa Catarina and Sergipe explicitly prohibit discrimi-
nation based on sexual orientation in their constitutions. 30 9 Brazil
decriminalized homosexual conduct in 183 1.310 Uruguay decriminalized ho-
mosexuality in 1934311 and a 2004 nondiscrimination law included sexual
orientation as a protected category; 312 hate crime laws have applied to
302 National Coalition I, supra note 300, at 14.
303 Id. at 18.
304 Id. at 9 23.
305 Id. at 9 25.
306 Id. at 26(a).
307 Id. at 91 26(b)-(c).
308 Id. at 91 27-28.
309 OrossoN, supra note 105, at 47.
310 Id. at 45.
311 Id.
312 Id. The law is Ley N' 17.817.
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crimes based on sexual orientation since 2003. 3 13 Impressively, Uruguay
was the first Latin American country to legalize same-sex unions, which
have been available since January 1, 2008. 314
Costa Rica has some of the most liberal protections in Central
America. Discrimination based on sexual orientation has been prohibited
there since 1998.3 15 On March 27, 2008, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias
Sanchez signed an executive order designating May 17 as the National Day
Against Homophobia.316
Mexico officially decriminalized homosexuality in 1872, when the
French occupied Mexico and imposed the Napoleonic Code, which "drew
no distinction between homosexual and heterosexual acts. ' 317 But this does
not mean Mexico has been a friendly place for sexual minorities. Public
immorality laws were used against sexual minorities until the 1998 penal
code removed such laws. 318 Even today, "[I]t is still a hotbed for 'hate
crimes'-especially against homosexuals. ' 31 9 Progress is apparent, never-
theless. A 2001 amendment to Article 1 of the Mexican constitution prohib-
its discrimination based, inter alia, on sexual orientation ("las
preferencias"). 320 A federal law protecting sexual minorities from discrimi-
nation was passed in 2003.321
313 OTTnOSSON, supra note 105, at 47.
314 Pride at Work, Uruguay Enacts Historic Civil Unions Law, http://www.prideat
work.org/page.php?id=560 (last visited Feb. 3, 2009).
315 OrrossoN, supra note 105, at 46.
316 PinkNews.co.uk, Costa Rica Backs International Day Against Homophobia,
May 1, 2008, http://www.pinknews.co.uk/news/articles/2005-7531.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 31, 2009).
317 Douglas Sanders, Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human
Rights Agenda, HUM. RTS. Q., Vol.18 No. 1, 67, 70 (1996).
318 See Lesbian & Gay Mexico, DIVA, http://www.divamag.co.uk/diva/listings.asp?
CID=648&action=ShowCountry (last visited Jan.31, 2009). See also Len Evans,
Chronology Of Mexican Gay History, http://www.geocities.com/gueroperro/Chron-
Mex.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
319 Mexico's Mindset Shifting on Homosexual Rights, THE REAL TRUTH, Mar. 23,
2007, available at http://www.realtruth.org/news/070323-001-societylifestyles.
html.
320 Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, as amended, Diario
Oficial de la Federaci6n, 5 de Febrero de 1917 (Mex.). Mexican Constitution,
available at http://www.diputados. gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/pdf/1.pdf.
321 Natara Williams, Pre-Hire Pregnancy Screening In Mexico's Maquiladoras: Is
It Discrimination?, DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 131, 146 (2005).
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The Constitutional Court of Colombia recently issued a ruling that
extended pension benefits to same-sex partners.3 22 The Court held that
same-sex partners should be given the same health and pension benefits "as
a family. ' 323 The Court stated that excluding same-sex partners "would vio-
late the principle of non-discrimination and human dignity as the expression
of personal autonomy, protected by international law. 324
A year earlier, in X v. Colombia, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee ruled in favor of a man who sought his deceased partner's pen-
sion.325 The Committee declared that denying a same-sex partner's pension
rights on the basis of his sexual orientation violated the right to equality and
non-discrimination protected by Article 26 of the ICCPR:
The Committee recalls its earlier jurisprudence that the pro-
hibition against discrimination under article 26 comprises
also discrimination based on sexual orientation. It also re-
calls that in previous communications the Committee found
that differences in benefit entitlements between married
couples and heterosexual unmarried couples were reasona-
ble and objective, as the couples in question had the choice
to marry or not, with all the ensuing consequences. The
Committee also notes that, while it was not open to the au-
thor to enter into marriage with his same-sex permanent
partner, [applicable Colombian law] does not make a dis-
tinction between married and unmarried couples but be-
tween homosexual and heterosexual couples. The
Committee finds that the State party has put forward no
argument that might demonstrate that such a distinction...
is reasonable and objective .... In this context, the Com-
mittee finds that the State party has violated article 26 of
the Covenant by denying the author's right to his life part-
ner's pension on the basis of his sexual orientation. 326
322 Sentencia C-336/08, 16 Apr. 2008, Bogota [Constitutional Court], D-6947 (Co-
lombia), available at http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2008/c-336-
08.rtf.
323 Colombia: Court Extends Benefits to Same-Sex Couples, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, Apr. 18, 2008, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/18/colomb18596
.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
324 Id.
325 Human Rights Committee, X v. Colombia (Communication No. 1361/2005, 14
May 2007).
326 Id. at 7.2.
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Canada has widespread legal protections for sexual minorities. The
1982 Charter guarantees equality for everyone, 327 and the Canadian Su-
preme Court has recognized sexual orientation as an explicitly protected
category. 328 The 1996 Human Rights Act provides a broad range of federal
protections for sexual minorities, and every Province has a Human Rights
Act. Since the Supreme Court's 1998 ruling in Vriend v. Alberta, every
Province and Territory has protected sexual orientation in its civil rights
laws. 329 In that case, Delwin Vriend was fired from his job as a lab coordi-
nator at King's College, Edmonton (a private religious college) because of
his sexual orientation. The Alberta Individual Rights Protection Act (IRPA)
did not include sexual orientation as a prohibited basis of discrimination at
that time, and Vriend asked the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench to declare
that the omission breached section 15 of the Charter. The Court ruled for
Vriend but the Alberta Court of Appeal reversed. The Canadian Supreme
Court then reversed the Court of Appeal and reinstated the ruling from the
Court of Queen's Bench. "The omission of sexual orientation as a protected
ground in the IRPA creates a distinction on the basis of sexual orientation,"
the Court stated. 30 "Gay men and lesbians are treated differently from other
disadvantaged groups and from heterosexuals. They, unlike gays and lesbi-
ans, receive protection from discrimination on the grounds that are likely to
be relevant to them."'33' The Court also stated, "IRPA, by its omission or
underinclusiveness, denies gays and lesbians the equal benefit and protec-
tion of the law on the basis of a personal characteristic, namely sexual
orientation. 332
Subsequently, the Civil Marriage Act of 2005 legalized same-sex
marriage in Canada, which became the fourth nation to authorize same-sex
marriage-preceded by the Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain. 333 To fore-
close legal challenges, the Canadian Government obtained advance affirma-
tion of the law's constitutionality from the Supreme Court. 334
327 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, Constitution Act, 1982, Section
15(1), available at http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca_1982.
html.
328 Egan v. Canada, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513.
329 Vriend v. Alberta, 1998 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS 19 (1998).
330 Id. at *80.
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Peter W. Hogg, "Canada: The Constitution and same-sex marriage", (2006)
ICON 4 4 (712) at 1, available at LexisNexis.
334 Id.
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The United States
In the United States, a minority of states have nondiscrimination
laws protecting sexual minorities. As of July 2008, thirteen states and the
District of Columbia banned discrimination based on sexual orientation and
gender identity or expression; 335 seven additional states banned discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation alone. 336 In addition, about 100 municipali-
ties in the thirty states lacking statewide nondiscrimination laws had local
nondiscrimination laws. 337 No federal law protects sexual minorities from
discrimination.
A majority of states have hate crime laws based on sexual orienta-
tion. In April 2008, twelve states and the District of Columbia had hate
crime laws that included crimes based on sexual orientation and gender
identity.338 Twenty more states had hate crime laws that included crimes
based on sexual orientation alone.3 39 Thirteen states had hate crime laws
that did not include crimes based on sexual orientation or gender identity,
3 40
and five states had no hate crime laws at all.34 1 The federal hate crime law
does not protect sexual minorities.
335 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Nondiscrimination laws map, http://
www.thetaskforce.org/reportsandresearch/nondiscriminationlaws (last visited
Feb. 27, 2009). The states are California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Hawai'i,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington.
336 Id. The states are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ne-
vada, New York, and Wisconsin.
337 Id.
338 National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Hate crimes laws map, http://www.
thetaskforce.org/reports and-research/hatecrimeslaws (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
The states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
and Vermont.
339 Id. The states are Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Michi-
gan mandates hate crime data collection including sexual orientation, but its hate
crime penalty laws do not include sexual orientation.
340 Id. Alabama, Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.
341 Id. Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, South Carolina, and Wyoming. Indiana man-
dates hate crime data collection including sexual orientation, but has no hate crime
penalty laws.
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Consensual adult homosexual conduct has been legal throughout
the United States only since the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas (2003).342 But the road to that decision was long and
difficult. Only seventeen years earlier, in Bowers v. Hardwick,343 the Court
held that states could maintain statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct.
Police officers observed Michael Hardwick in his bedroom, engaging in a
consensual homosexual act with another adult man. Hardwick was charged
with violating a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy, and challenged the
statute's constitutionality in federal court. The Georgia Attorney General,
Michael Bowers, appealed an Eleventh Circuit ruling that the statute uncon-
stitutionally violated Hardwick's fundamental due process rights under
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 344 In a 5-4 decision, the Su-
preme Court held that there was no constitutional protection for homosex-
ual acts, and that states were free to make such acts illegal. 345 Justice Byron
White, writing for the majority, stated, "Proscriptions against that conduct
have ancient roots .... [T]o claim that a right to engage in such conduct is
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or 'implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious.3 46
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote an eloquent dissent that is still
widely quoted, and gave solace to many in the period following the Court's
ruling. After a pointed opening, Blackmun stated:
The statute at issue . . . denies individuals the right to de-
cide for themselves whether to engage in particular forms
of private, consensual sexual activity. The Court concludes
that [the statute] is valid essentially because "the laws of
• ..many States ...still make such conduct illegal and
have done so for a very long time." But the fact that the
moral judgments expressed by statutes like [this] may be
"'natural and familiar... ought not to conclude our judg-
ment upon the question whether statutes embodying them
conflict with the Constitution of the United States.' ,,347
Blackmun believed the Georgia statute violated Hardwick's right to pri-
vacy. "If that right means anything, it means that, before Georgia can prose-
342 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
343 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
344 Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
315 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
346 Id. at 192-94.
347 Id. at 199 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973) (quoting Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting))).
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cute its citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their
lives, it must do more than assert that the choice they have made is an
'abominable crime not fit to be named among Christians.' ,,348 Regarding
religious arguments in the State's brief, Blackmun stated: "The assertion
that 'traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe' the conduct involved can-
not provide an adequate justification for [the statute]. That certain, but by
no means all, religious groups condemn the behavior at issue gives the State
no license to impose their judgments on the entire citizenry. 349
In 2003, the Supreme Court overturned Bowers v. Hardwick with
its holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 350 and held that laws criminalizing con-
sensual homosexual conduct violated the liberty and privacy rights of the
United States Constitution: "Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers
v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled." 351
Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Lawrence.
The Court finally recognized that private, intimate relationships between
consenting adults should not be subject to government scrutiny or control
simply because the participants were of the same sex. "Liberty protects the
person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places," Justice Kennedy wrote.352 "In our tradition the State is not
omnipresent in the home. And there are other spheres of our lives and exis-
tence, outside the home, where the State should not be a dominant
presence." 353
Parts of Kennedy's opinion evoked the spirit of opinions from the
South African Constitutional Court; for example, "adults may choose to
enter upon [a personal] relationship in the confines of their homes and their
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. . . . The
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice. '354
The Court's opinion did not leave the moralistic arguments un-
heeded. "It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was
making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices
348 Id. at 200 (quotation marks altered) (quoting Herring v. State, 119 Ga. 709, 721
(1904)).
349 Id. at 211. See generally Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 20, Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (No. 85-140), available at LexisNexis.
350 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
351 Id. at 578.
352 Id. at 562.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 567.
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to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been
shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior,
and respect for the traditional family. ' 355 Justice Kennedy, himself a Roman
Catholic, acknowledged these voices: "For many persons these are not triv-
ial concerns but profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and
moral principles to which they aspire and which thus determine the course
of their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us,
however .... 'Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate
our own moral code.' 356
The Court also acknowledged the equality concern, but the majority
decided the case on due process grounds: "Equality of treatment and the
due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substan-
tive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a decision on
the latter point advances both interests. '357 Justice Kennedy explained, "If
protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so. remains
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. '358 Again remi-
niscent of South African opinions, the Court seemed to want to make an
exceedingly clear statement: "When homosexual conduct is made criminal
by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to
subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres. '359
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor cast seemingly incongruous votes
with the respective majorities in both Bowers and Lawrence. She did not
admit in Lawrence that she erred in Bowers, or that her thinking had simply
evolved. Instead, she wrote a concurring opinion in Lawrence agreeing with
the result but on equal protection grounds. 360
Justice Antonin Scalia penned a scathing dissent.361 But he seemed
angrier about the Court's abortion decisions than about the Lawrence deci-
sion itself. He sounded frantic and old-fashioned when he talked about sex
and morals:
355 Id. at 571.
356 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
850 (1992)).
357 Id. at 575.
358 Id.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 579-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
361 Id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality,
and obscenity are ... sustainable only in light of Bowers'
validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one
of these laws is called into question by today's decision; the
Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to
exclude them from its holding. '3 62
Scalia also indicted a considerable portion of the American legal profes-
sion: "Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a
law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosex-
ual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual
activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally
attached to homosexual conduct. '363
Laws recognizing and protecting relationships are still woefully
lacking in the United States. Only Massachusetts and Connecticut have full
marriage equality. Two states, New York and Rhode Island, recognize
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere.364 In November 2008, four states
had laws recognizing civil unions, 365 and two states plus the District of Co-
lumbia had domestic relationship laws.366 Three states had more limited re-
lationship recognition laws.367 Federal law is blatantly discriminatory.
Under the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),368 enacted with overwhelm-
ing Congressional support in 1996 and signed by President Clinton, no state
is required to recognize a relationship between persons of the same sex as a
marriage, even if the relationship was legally performed in a state that rec-
ognizes same-sex marriage. In addition, the Federal Government cannot
treat same-sex relationships as marriages for any purpose, under any cir-
cumstances. Although many have questioned whether this Act should stand
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, no
court has ruled on the matter.
President Barack Obama was not in the United States Senate when
the DOMA was passed, but has repeatedly stated that he supports its re-
362 Id. at 590.
363 Id. at 602.
364 See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Relationship Recognition Map for
Same-Sex Couples in the United States, http://www.thetaskforce.org/reportsand
_research/relationshipjrecognition (last visited Feb. 9, 2009).
365 Id. California, New Hampshire New Jersey, and Vermont.
366 Id. District of Columbia, Oregon, and Washington.
367 Id. Hawai'i, Maine, and Maryland.
368 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
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peal.369 President Obama responded to a Human Rights Campaign question-
naire in 2007, and his answers are encouraging. 370 His responses were clear
statements that he "believe[s] the Employment Non-Discrimination Act
should be expanded to include sexual orientation and gender identity";
wants to "expand federal jurisdiction to reach violent hate crimes perpe-
trated because of . . . sexual orientation [or] gender identity"; supports
"bring[ing] Medicaid coverage to low-income, HIV-positive Americans"
and "increased funding for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment and research";
believes "the federal government recognize [a] state's legal recognition of
[same-sex] couples ... for purposes of federal benefits and tax treatment";
"supports the expansion of the Family and Medical Leave Act to cover
domestic partners and their children"; supports "modifying the Social Se-
curity System to pay survivor benefits to the same-sex partners of gay and
lesbian people"; favors "domestic partner coverage for gay and lesbian em-
ployees of the civilian federal workforce"; "believe[s] there are too many
children who need loving parents to deny one group of people adoption
rights"; would support a law allowing "an American citizen to petition for
immigration sponsorship for a same-sex partner"; and supports a repeal of
the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. 371 The President does not
support national same-sex marriage, but "believe[s] civil unions should in-
clude the same legal rights that accompany a marriage license. '372 He
"would oppose any effort to stifle a state's ability to decide this question on
its own. '373
Many Americans are hopeful that President Obama will lead the
United States in taking more progressive and proactive positions on rights
for sexual minorities. He has stated:
While we have come a long way since the Stonewall riots
in 1969, we still have a lot of work to do. Too often, the
issue of LGBT rights is exploited by those seeking to di-
vide us. But at its core, this issue is about who we are as
Americans. It's about whether this nation is going to live
369 See, e.g., Alex Okrent, Equality is a Moral Imperative, http://my.barackobama.
com/page/community/post/alexokrent/gGggJS (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
370 See HRC, '08 Presidential Candidates Respond to HRC's Questionnaire on
GLBT Issues, http://www.hrc.org/news/5207.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
371 HRC, 2008 Presidential Questionnaire-Senator Barack Obama, http://pride.
barackobama.com/page/content/lgbthome (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
372 Id.
373 Id.
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up to its founding promise of equality by treating all its
citizens with dignity and respect.174
California, with its large population and extreme political views on
both sides of the spectrum, continues to be a focal point for sexual minori-
ties' rights in the United States. In 1977, the California legislature passed a
statute stating, "Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract
between a man and a woman . . . . 75 Voters affirmed this sentiment in
2000, when they approved Proposition 22, which stated, "[o]nly marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California. 3 76 In
1999, the legislature and governor had enacted a statute that "established a
domestic partnership registry, granted hospital visitation privileges to regis-
tered domestic partners equal to those of spouses and other immediate fam-
ily members, and gave health benefits to domestic partners of state
employees."3 77 Subsequently, in 2003, the legislature and governor enacted
the Domestic Partners Rights and Responsibilities Act,378 "which extended
to registered domestic partners virtually all of the rights and responsibilities
of marriage. ' 379 In 2005 and 2007, the legislature passed bills that would
have legalized same-sex marriage, both of which were vetoed by Governor
Arnold Schwarzenegger. 380
On May 15, 2008, the California Supreme Court issued a decision
declaring unconstitutional state statutes that limited marriage to opposite-
sex couples s.38 Throughout its opinion, the Court relied heavily on Perez v.
Sharp,382 the 1948 landmark decision which held that statutes prohibiting
374 Obama Pride, http://pride.barackobama.com/page/content/lgbthome (last visited
Feb. 4, 2009).
375 CAL. FAM. CODE § 300 (West 2008), invalidated by In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384 (2008).
376 Marriage Watch, California Proposition 22, http://www.marriagewatch.org/
media/prop22.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009). Proposition 22 passed with 61.4% of
the vote.
377 UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies, Same-Sex Marriage in Califor-
nia - Overview and Issues, http://igs.berkeley.edu/library/htGayMarriage.html (last
visited Feb.4, 2009). The statute was AB26. Assembly Bill, http://www.leginfo.ca.
gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab 26_bill_19991010_chaptered.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2009).
378 Assem. B. 205, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-O4/bill/asm/ab_0201-0250/
ab_205_bill_ 20030922_chaptered.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
379 UC Berkeley Institute of Governmental Studies, supra note 377.
380 AB19, vetoed Sep. 29, 2005, and AB43, vetoed Oct. 12, 2007.
381 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 ( Cal. 2008).
382 Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948).
276 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 15
interracial marriage were unconstitutional. The 2008 Court applied the strict
scrutiny standard, explaining, "Because sexual orientation, like gender,
race, or religion, is a characteristic that frequently has been the basis for
biased and improperly stereotypical treatment and that generally bears no
relation to an individual's ability to perform or contribute to society, it is
appropriate for courts to evaluate with great care and with considerable
skepticism any statute that embodies such a classification. 383 The Court
acknowledged that the California Constitution does not explicitly recognize
a marriage right, but stated that "past California cases establish beyond
question that the right to marry is a fundamental right whose protection is
guaranteed to all persons by the California Constitution. 384
The right to marry, stated the Court, is "presumably ... embodied
as a component of the liberty protected by the state due process clause," 385
but is also protected by "an individual's interest in personal autonomy by
California's explicit state constitutional privacy clause." 386 Ultimately, it
found that "the right to marry represents the right of an individual to estab-
lish a legally recognized family with the person of one's choice, and, as
such, is of fundamental significance both to society and to the individ-
ual. '387 "In recognizing ... that the right to marry is a basic, constitutionally
protected civil right-a fundamental right of free men and women - the
governing California cases establish that this right embodies fundamental
interests of an individual that are protected from abrogation or elimination
by the state." 388 The Court rejected voter initiative measures such as Pro-
position 22 because "initiative measures adopted by the electorate are sub-
ject to the same constitutional limitations that apply to statutes adopted by
the Legislature .... ,,389 Finally, the Court held that language that limited
marriage to opposite-sex couples was "unconstitutional and must be
stricken from the statute, and that the remaining statutory language must be
understood as making the designation of marriage available both to oppo-
site-sex and same-sex couples. 390
The California Supreme Court's decision outraged conservative
groups, who lost no time gathering signatures to put a voter initiative ques-
tion on the November ballot, ultimately known as Proposition 8. The pur-
383 In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 444.
384 Id. at 419.
385 Id. at 420.
386 Id.
387 Id. at 423.
388 Id. at 426 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis removed).
389 Id. at 449.
390 Id. at 453.
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pose of Proposition 8 was to add language to the California Constitution
stating, "[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recog-
nized in California."'39' The campaign was intense, and many people and
organizations from outside the state participated. Spending ultimately ex-
ceeded $83 million.392 Noteworthy supporters of the measure included the
Roman Catholic Church, 393 the Mormon Church, 394 and Republican presi-
dential candidate John McCain. 395 On November 4, 2008, California voters
approved Proposition 8 with 52% of the vote. 396
After the election, numerous lawsuits were filed seeking to overturn
Proposition 8 and for a holding that the measure is not retroactive. On No-
vember 19, 2008, the California Supreme Court denied requests to stay en-
forcement of Proposition 8.1 97 The Court also agreed to decide three issues
presented in cases filed opposing Proposition 8: (1) "Is Proposition 8 inva-
lid because it constitutes a revision of, rather than an amendment to, the
California Constitution?", (2) "Does Proposition 8 violate the separation-of-
powers doctrine under the California Constitution?", and (3) "If Proposition
8 is not unconstitutional, what is its effect, if any, on the marriages of same-
sex couples performed before the adoption of Proposition 8?" Briefs are due
in January 2009, and oral argument is expected in March 2009.
391 Smartvoter.org, Proposition 8, http://www.smartvoter.org/2008/1 1/04/ca/state/
prop/8/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
392 Lisa Leff, Donors pumped $83M to Calif. gay marriage campaign, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_11612308?IADID=search-
www.mercurynews.com-www.mercurynews.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
391 See Advocate.com, Catholic Bishops Endorse Prop. 8, http://www.advocate.
com/newsdetail_ektid59060.asp (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
394 See Newsroom, California and Same-Sex Marriage, http://newsroom.lds.org/
ldsnewsroom/eng/commentary/califomia-and-same-sex-marriage (last visited Feb.
4, 2009). See also Joe Pyrah, LDS donate millions to fight gay marriage, PROVO
DAILY HERALD, http://www.heraldextra.com/content/view/280669/3/ (last visted
Feb. 4, 2009).
395 Justin Ewers, McCain Supports Efforts to Ban Gay Marriage, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/campaign-2008/2008/06/
27/mccain-supports-efforts-to-ban-gay-marriage.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
396 DEBRA BOWEN (CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE), STATEMENT OF VOTE 7 (2008), availa-
ble at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008-general/sov-complete.pdf.
397 Judicial Council Of California, California Supreme Court Takes Action on Pro-
position 8, News Release, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/
newsreleases/NR66-08.PDF. See Strauss v. Horton, No. S168047 (Cal. 2008) (en
banc); Tyler v. California, No. S168066 (Cal. 2008) (en banc); San Francisco v.
Horton, No. S168078 (Cal. 2008) (en banc).
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In October 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court decided Kerrigan
v. Commissioner of Public Health.398 Connecticut had civil unions for
same-sex couples, but a state statute prohibited same-sex marriage. In Ker-
rigan, eight same-sex couples challenged the statute, arguing that it violated
their state constitutional rights to substantive due process and equal protec-
tion.399 A lower court had granted summary judgment to the state. On re-
view, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, "[I]n light of the history of
pernicious discrimination faced by gay men and lesbians, and because...
marriage carries with it a status and significance that the newly created
classification of civil unions does not embody, the segregation of heterosex-
ual and homosexual couples into separate institutions constitutes a cogniza-
ble harm. '400 The Court found that the state's "statutory scheme
impermissibly discriminates against gay persons on account of their sexual
orientation," so they reversed the lower court and remanded the case "with
direction to grant the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 40 1
The Court noted that when "the intended effect of a law is to treat
politically unpopular or historically disfavored minorities differently from
persons in the majority or favored class, that law cannot evade constitu-
tional review under the separate but equal doctrine,' 402 and that "there is no
doubt that civil unions enjoy a lesser status in our society than marriage. 403
Finding that under the Connecticut constitution, sexual minorities are a pro-
tected class,404 the Court acknowledged the commitment of many people "to
preserving the traditional concept of marriage as a heterosexual institu-
tion. '40 5 But the Court noted that "[t]radition alone never can provide suffi-
cient cause to discriminate against a protected class .... -406 When there is
no "sound justification for denying same sex couples the right to marry, it
therefore may be true, as Justice Scalia has asserted, that 'preserving the
traditional institution of marriage is just a kinder way of describing the
state's moral disapproval of same-sex couples. ' ' 40 7 The Court then ob-
served, "Moral disapproval alone ... is insufficient reason to benefit one
398 Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
399 Id. at 411.
400 Id. at 412.
401 Id. at 413.
402 Id. at 418.
403 Id. at 419.
404 See generally id.
405 Id. at 478.
406 Id. at 479.
407 Id. (internal punctuation omitted; emphasis removed) (quoting Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 601 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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group and not another because statutory classifications cannot be 'drawn for
the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.' "408
VI. PROPOSALS
Three basic truths must be acknowledged. First, many nations have
made great strides toward nondiscrimination and equality for sexual minori-
ties. Second, in most parts of the world, the legal protections afforded sex-
ual minorities could be improved, and in many places vastly improved.
Third, laws can go only so far toward accomplishing ultimate goals of equal
rights and nondiscrimination.
Addressing the third point first, enacting laws will neither change
attitudes nor dissolve long-held prejudices. What it will do is extend the
protection of the law to sexual minorities-people who are longstanding
objects of many kinds of ill and unfair treatment. As discussed earlier, it
also will express the intent of the state to condone nothing but equal and
fair treatment of everyone, regardless of gender identity or sexual orienta-
tion. The will of the state should ideally be the will of the higher nature of
the people, after all. Results will not be instantaneous, but over time, atti-
tudes and minds will change; deep prejudices will weaken and eventually
evaporate and the majority of people will someday wonder how society
ever treated sexual minorities so badly. As Michel Foucault stated, "Justice
must always question itself, just as society can exist only by means of the
work it does on itself and on its institutions. '40 9
The United States, which likes to consider itself the world's leader,
must step forward and take a prominent role in encouraging humane treat-
ment of sexual minorities, abolition of repressive laws, and adoption of pro-
tective ones. Obviously, the nation can only do this if it has taken such steps
within its own borders. Nothing less than the full spectrum of rights ac-
corded to heterosexuals must also be recognized for sexual minorities. It is
past time for the United States to enact federal legislation prohibiting any
form of discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation, and
to extend federal hate crime laws to apply to those same categories. The
DOMA must be repealed, and the right of states to enact their own marriage
laws has to be protected. I am far less interested in what things are called
than the substance of the rights-for example, marriage versus civil union.
Although I recognize that many do not agree with me, I believe the most
408 Id. (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996)).
409 DIDIER ERIBON, MICHEL FOUCAULT ?? (Bestsy Wing trans., Harvard University
Press 1991) (1989).
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important thing is to get the substantive rights in place; we can then argue
about what to call them.
It is vital that nations with more enlightened laws find ways to
work together to persuade the rest of the world to begin moving in the right
direction. While no one can guarantee what another sovereign nation will
do, we could make it very difficult for nations to thrive that refuse to recog-
nize fundamental rights for sexual minorities. We have proven to be quick
to apply sanctions and even go to war over far less serious issues than exe-
cuting one person for loving another. I absolutely do not propose or favor
military action, but if even some small portion of the resourcefulness used
to persuade nations on other issues were applied to the goal of obtaining
rights recognition for sexual minorities, it could make a tremendous
difference.
Some possibilities to be explored might include incentives or re-
wards for states that accord equal rights to sexual minorities or at least
demonstrate progress toward that goal, increased status of such nations in
international fora, and trade and economic sanctions for states that refuse to
comply. I do not claim that accomplishing these things would be easy, but
surely the goals of equality and ending discrimination are worthy enough to
inspire serious efforts. What we cannot do is nothing. If we wait to see what
will happen and trust that improvements will be made in due time, we will
almost certainly find ourselves going nowhere.
VII. CONCLUSION
At the outset of this article I asked the question whether sexual
identity has already been established as a fundamental human right, and if
not, why? The answer is neither simple nor apparent: it has, but it has not.
Some factors indicate that such a fundamental right has been recog-
nized at an aspirational level. The IBHR and other international treaties
declare such truths as, "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights, '410 and "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law." 411 Many peo-
ple argue persuasively, as discussed above, that such documents as well as
constitutions and statutes have already recognized rights for sexual minori-
ties. Others argue that existing rights could be expanded to protect sexual
minorities' rights. Even people who are opposed to laws specifically guar-
410 UDHR, supra note 29, pmbl., art. 1. See also Charter of the United Nations
(San Francisco, 26 June 1945), 3 Bevans 1153, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, entered
into force 24 Oct. 1945, prnbl.
411 ICCPR, supra note 30, art. 26.
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anteeing the rights of sexual minorities often claim that such laws are un-
necessary because sexual minorities are already protected by the same laws
that protect everyone else, although their goal is certainly not to recognize a
right to have an atypical sexual identity. 412
Also militating toward the conclusion that a fundamental right has
been recognized is the fact that so many nations and states have recognized
important rights for sexual minorities in their laws and constitutions. Some
believe that with every positive legislative change or judicial decision,
something akin to a trend becomes slightly more visible. Where rights for
sexual minorities have been recognized, the recognition has tended to mani-
fest in two ways: first, as extensions of existing rights that belong to every-
one-particularly equality, privacy, and liberty; and second, as portions of
constitutions and statutes that purport to guarantee and protect the rights of
sexual minorities in particular.
But in many countries, sexual minorities have no rights, and in
some they can still be punished by death. Unquestionably, rights for sexual
minorities are a long way from entrenchment as customary, binding interna-
tional law by opinio juris.413 Many factors contribute to the reluctance and
outright refusal of so many states to recognize rights for everyone regard-
less of sexual identity. Perhaps foremost among these are tradition, religion,
morality, and fear. The most significant factor, however, is likely the heter-
onormativity that permeates every society in the world. Even as undeniable
progress is made in recognizing rights for sexual minorities, a backlash is
felt as the heteronormative power structure struggles to maintain its
influence.
The recognition and protection of sexual minorities' rights has been
strongest in the industrialized Western world, especially in Western Europe
and Canada, but there are important exceptions. Especially noteworthy are
South Africa, some eastern European nations (e.g., Czech Republic and
Hungary), and parts of Latin America (e.g., Uruguay and Costa Rica), all
nations with less economic and industrial influence that are struggling to be
particularly attentive to the rights of all persons.
412 See, e.g., Alysse Michelle El Hage, Special Rights for Homosexuals: Why Sex-
ual Orientation Should Not Be a Protected Class, FINDINGS 4 (1999), available at
http://www.ncfamily.org/PolicyPapers/Findings%209907%2OSpecial%20rts.pdf
("[T]hese bills aren't really about protecting homosexuals .... Homosexuals are
already protected in these areas just like everyone else.) See also Citizenlink.com,
Hate-Crimes Bill Would Give Gays Special Rights, citizenlink.com, http://www.
citizenlink.org/CLNews/A000004181 .cfm.
413 See Opinio juris sive necessitate, supra note 34.
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The United States is in the unenviable position of being the pre-
sumptive leader of the world-a leader who simply cannot make up her
mind to lead in this important area. The reasons are many, and include such
things as the strong conservative trend of the last thirty years and the com-
mensurate influence of evangelical fundamentalist Christians, as well as the
inertia of the federal/state governmental dichotomy. The federal system is
waiting for states to make changes, while the states are waiting for leader-
ship from the federal system. The national leaders cannot seem to under-
stand finally that strong federal action will be necessary, just as it has been
in other situations involving rights advancement for minorities.
When the more progressive nations can work together to lead more
reluctant ones, we will see real progress in the world. With the continued
example and leadership of nations further along than the United States and
new leadership in Washington, D.C., the solution may not be so far away.
Mahatma Ghandi's wisdom can instruct us all:
The true source of right is duty. If we all discharge our
duties, rights will not be far to seek. If leaving duties unper-
formed we run after rights, they will escape us like a will-o-
the-wisp.41
4
414 Mohandas K. Ghandi, Presidential Address at Kathiawar Political Conference,
Bhavanagar, Jan. 8, 1925, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Online, vol. 30,
available at www.gandhiserve.org/cwmgVOL03O.PDF.
